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THE PARTNERSHIP MYSTIQUE: LAW FIRM FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AMERICAN
LAW FIRM

MAYA STEINITZ*
ABSTRACT
This Article identifies and analyzes the de facto and de jure end of
lawyers’ exclusivity over the practice of law in the United States. This
development will have profound implications for the legal profession,
the careers of individual lawyers, and the justice system as a whole.
First, the Article argues that various financial products that have
recently flooded the legal market are functionally equivalent to investing in and owning law firms and create all the same governance
challenges as allowing nonlawyers to directly own stock in law firms.
Second, the Article analyzes Arizona’s groundbreaking legalization
of nonlawyer participation in law firms, effective January 1, 2021,
and the effects it will have nationally.
Third, the Article explains that the drawbacks of liberalizing the
practice of law are rooted in the conception of shareholder primacy,
a bedrock principle of corporate law. This principle would encourage
lawyers to prioritize profit maximization for the benefit of their investors over the interests of clients and the courts.
Fourth, despite the apparent dangers, there are reasons to celebrate the end of the era of the legal practice as the exclusive purview
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of lawyers. Lawyers’ monopoly on the practice of law hinders inclusion and diversity and, counterintuitively, undermines practitioners’ dignity and well-being.
Fifth, the apparent dangers of liberalization can be avoided if
states follow Arizona in allowing nonlawyer participation in the
practice of law but condition it on organization as an Alternative
Business Structure with certain professional responsibilities. More
specifically, the Article proposes a type of “benefit entity,” which I call
“legal benefit entity” (LBE). LBEs will be required to privilege the
interests of clients and the courts over those of investors. The final
Part explains what an LBE should look like.
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INTRODUCTION
The drawbridge is down. The barbarians are through the gates.
The ship has sailed. While the legal profession was asleep at the
switch, nonlawyer “takeover” of law firms—resisted strenuously by
the bar for at least a century1—has become a reality. This has been
true de facto for a number of years, and, as of January 1, 2021, it
became true de jure in the state of Arizona. It is now widely acknowledged that litigation finance has, in the past decade, without
any change to black letter law, felled the centuries-old champerty
prohibition2—the prohibition on a nonparty funding a party’s claim
for a profit.3 This Article will show, for the first time, that litigation
financiers have accomplished the same with respect to the similarly
entrenched prohibition on nonlawyer participation (ownership and
management) in law firms, which the profession has alternately
considered and rejected in a cycle that has persisted for more than
a century.
Over the past three or so years, litigation finance firms have
refocused from providing third-party financing to plaintiffs for single cases to financing portfolios of cases and providing the financing
directly to law firms.4 In addition, litigation finance firms are incubating new law firms and affiliating themselves with such law
firms.5 Financing pools of cases is economically functionally equivalent, or at least a very close approximation, to outright investment
in a law firm. And, critically, it creates all the same governance
challenges as does allowing nonlawyers to directly own stock in law
firms: conflicts of interest, disclosure requirements that conflict with

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. Champerty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
4. See infra Part III.A.2; see also Press Release, Omni Bridgeway, Bentham IMF Unveils
New Portfolio Model for Litigation Funding (Nov. 16, 2015), https://omnibridgeway.com/
insights/press-releases/all-press-releases/2015/11/16/bentham-imf-unveils-new-portfoliomodel-for-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/M7HL-SVPT]; Commercial Litigation Funding,
PRAVATI CAPITAL, https://pravaticapital.com/commercial-litigation-funding/ [https://perma.cc/
75HC-R5FP]; Portfolio Finance, BURFORD CAPITAL, https://www.burfordcapital.com/how-wework/expertise/portfolio-finance/ [https://perma.cc/P55S-6RAE].
5. See Press Release, Omni Bridgeway, supra note 4.
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the attorney-client privilege, potential short-termism, incentive to
interfere in the attorneys’ independent judgment, and more.6
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Arizona recently unveiled revolutionary changes to the rules governing the practice of law in that
state.7 Although this experiment is in its infancy, its effects are sure
to permanently change the character of the legal profession in the
United States. The new regime abolishes the longstanding prohibition on fee-sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers, explicitly
allowing nonlawyers to hold an economic interest in, and even to
manage, law firms.8
Market trends and forces, both domestic and international, have
helped bring about these changes, and they will continue to propel
the legal industry in the direction of nonlawyer participation in the
business of providing legal services. Direct competitors of American
firms, importantly in London, can not only seek investments but
may also go public and list on stock exchanges.9 The so-called Big
Four accounting firms have resurged in the global legal services
markets and are predicted to increasingly compete with large,
multinational law firms (BigLaw).10 At least one U.S.-based “legal
staffing” firm, Axiom, recently embarked on the process of making
an initial public offering—though it ultimately opted for private
equity investment instead.11
As these changes become more entrenched and more clearly on
the sunny side of the law, the need for litigation finance boutiques—that specialize in investment in the esoteric and hard-tovalue asset that is a lawsuit12—will likely fade because investments
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See News Release, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., Arizona Supreme Court
Makes Generational Advance in Access to Justice (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.azcourts.gov/
Portals/201/Press%20Releases/2020Releases/082720RulesAgenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/65P343AG].
8. See id.
9. See infra Part III.A.3.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, PwC, the Accounting Giant, Will Open a Law Firm in the
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/dealbook/
pwc-law-firm-ilc.html [https://perma.cc/2C3Q-XTBR].
11. Roy Strom, Lawyer Staffing Firm Axiom Takes PE Money, Drops IPO Plans, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 5, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/lawyer-staffingfirm-axiom-takes-pe-money-drops-ipo-plans [https://perma.cc/9WVM-MUUA].
12. See generally Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal
Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1903-04 (2013).
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in law firms do not require any expertise beyond what traditional
investors such as banks and hedge funds already have (perhaps
with the assistance of lawyer-analysts). Cinema did not eliminate
theater, Kindle did not extinguish books, and (for those who grew up
in the ’80s) video did not “kill the radio star.”13 Lawsuit financing
will also likely survive law firm financing, but its market share is
likely to shrink significantly.
These inevitable changes have begun to provoke some attempts
at regulation, falling mainly into one of two categories: disclosure or
licensing-and-ethics. In response to the rise of portfolio financing,
at least one prominent group, the New York City Bar Association
(NYCBA), has proposed that the practice be legalized and regulated
through a disclosure regime.14 The Arizona experiment, by contrast,
creates a licensing regime which imposes attorneys’ ethical obligations on Alternative Business Structures (ABSs) and on the nonlawyer participants.15
While the Arizona model is much preferable to the NYCBA’s
disclosure proposal—a vast body of literature has shown that disclosure is ineffective in protecting consumers16—both fail to adequately address deep-rooted concerns about the effect of allowing
nonlawyer participation on the core values of the legal profession.
Decades of discourse have drawn out those concerns in detail.
Mainly, the worry is that allowing nonlawyer participation would
create conflicts of interest, compromise lawyers’ ability to exercise
independent judgment, erode clients’ trust, undermine the ability of
the profession as a whole to deliver public goods like upholding the
rule of law, and diminish the dignity of the profession and the wellbeing of its practitioners.
This Article argues that while the focus on incentives and agency
costs (conflicts of interest) is correct, it overlooks a key cause for
concern, which can be traced back to a particular conception of
corporate governance, one that has dominated U.S. law and discourse for much of the last century: shareholder primacy. This
13. The Buggles, Video Killed the Radio Star, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=W8r-tXRLazs [https://perma.cc/4ZPE-YWH2].
14. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
ASSOCIATION WORKING GROUP ON LITIGATION FUNDING 24 (2020).
15. See News Release, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., supra note 7.
16. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
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Article then suggests a way to resolve that tension by taking advantage of new laws that permit entities to organize according to an
alternative conception of corporate governance: stakeholder primacy.
Under shareholder primacy, by operation of law, the interests of
the shareholders reign supreme. The interest of all other stakeholders—consumers, employees, society at large, and others—are
subordinate and, in fact, inappropriate for managers to consider
when they directly compete with profit maximization. Shareholders’
(or “economic interest holders” in the parlance of the Arizona reform17) interests, according to this doctrine, are generally understood to exclusively mean profit maximization.18 Thus, lawyers’
ethical duties to clients, the courts, or the public good, to the extent
that they could compel choices that would decrease profits, would be
in direct competition with economic interest holders’ interests.
While the NYCBA’s proposed disclosure-focused regime gestures
in the direction of resolving this tension by mentioning lawyers’
obligation to exercise independent judgment,19 disclosure, by itself,
cannot change the structure of corporate law and the interests it
privileges. And the NYCBA’s proposal could even be read to favor
shareholder (economic interest holder) primacy, as long as clients
have been presented with some fine print. The Supreme Court of
Arizona’s rules explicitly provide for client primacy and impose legal
ethical duties on ABSs and nonlawyer participants.20 But the Supreme Court of Arizona did not directly address the clear contradiction between its new legal ethics regime and the well-established
business law on shareholder primacy, setting up a conflict between
the two.21 Nor is it clear that the court could resolve that contradiction on its own. The Supreme Court of Arizona has the power under
the state constitution to regulate the practice of law, but it is not
clear that it can, sua sponte, alter the fundamental structure of
corporate law or abandon an established norm like shareholder
primacy.22 In a nutshell, because the reform was done by way of
regulations promulgated by the Supreme Court of Arizona, not by
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See News Release, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., supra note 7.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at 24.
See infra Part II.E.3.
See infra Part III.E.4.
See infra Part III.E.6.
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the legislature, the effect is to create an inevitable collision between
shareholder and stakeholder primacy in the new economy for legal
services.
Fortunately for the future of nonlawyer participation in providing
legal services (which is here whether one likes it or not), shareholder primacy is no longer the only available way to conduct business. The rise of benefit entities is the culmination of a years-long
project to construct a viable model of stakeholder primacy that,
while turning the fundamental principle of shareholder primacy on
its head where it applies, in all other ways coheres with settled U.S.
business law.23 Permitting and requiring entities in which nonlawyers participate in the business of law to organize as “legal benefit
entities” (LBEs) would preserve client primacy. Doing so not only
“fixes” existing, incomplete regimes, but also clears up a powerful
objection to a practice that is otherwise normatively desirable for
both clients and the legal profession. Liberalizing participation in
providing legal services could not only promote access to justice—
the main reason rightfully cited by its proponents over the years—
but also reduce barriers for advancement for women and minorities
and increase work-life balance for members of the profession. (Yes,
that last bit is not an error.)
Therefore, this Article advocates that nonlawyer participation in
law firms, including direct ownership and public trading (which
would go further than Arizona’s reform), be permitted under certain
conditions and that one of those conditions be that law firms that
opt to proceed on that route organize as LBEs. This would mean
that they bind themselves, through their organizational documents
enforced by statute, to govern themselves for the benefit of their
clients and the courts, not only their investors. In states that do not
yet allow benefit entities and that do not wish to make them broadly
available but still want to liberalize the legal profession, legislatures
could pass limited legislation legalizing LBEs but not making
benefit entities available more broadly.
Finally, this argument also implies an important proposition for
the business (corporate) law of the professions more generally. In
the context of professional services, where the interests of the client

23. See infra Part II.A.
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or patient should, as a matter of ethics, be placed above the profitmaking interests of owners, an exception to the shareholder primacy
doctrine should be created through general business law. The Arizona legal profession, for example, has now indicated its preference
for such an exception (though without explicitly creating one, as will
be discussed below).24 With the recent invention and advent of benefit entities, we have a business organization form that creates
default rules and a statutory regime that allows precisely for that.
***
Part I lays out the history and rationales behind the prohibition
on nonlawyer participation in the practice of law. Part II argues
that such rationales are rooted in a conception of business law
characterized by shareholder primacy and explains why that conception leads to the fear of what I call the “Goldman Sachs-ization”
of law. Part II also discusses how growing discontent with the
doctrine of shareholder primacy has led to the creation of a new
business form—the benefit entity. Part III sets forth the claim that
nonlawyer participation in law firms is already a fait accompli, exploring Arizona’s new legal ethics-based reform, contrasting it with
the NYCBA’s disclosure-focused proposal, and arguing that neither
approach fully resolves the tension between shareholder primacy
and lawyers’ duties to clients and courts. Part IV offers a normative
argument for overturning the prohibition on nonlawyer participation and lays out the proposal for replacing shareholder primacy
with stakeholder primacy by requiring law firms that wish to
include nonlawyers to be organized as LBEs. This Part also includes
a note on how the proposal could apply to other professions. Finally,
a Conclusion provides some closing thoughts.

24. See infra Part III.E.2.
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I. THE PROHIBITION ON NONLAWYER PARTICIPATION IN THE
BUSINESS OF PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES—HISTORY AND
RATIONALES
Though perhaps recently superseded by events on the ground, the
prohibition on nonlawyer participation in law firms has persisted
nearly unchanged for more than a century and has served, at least
in theory and possibly in practice, to safeguard important public
values.
A number of prohibitions and proscriptions in the rules of professional conduct that govern lawyers form the overarching prohibition on nonlawyer participation in the practice of law, including
investment in or partial or full ownership of law firms by nonlawyers, and management of law firms. These include rules that directly regulate such participation including the fee-sharing prohibition, which prohibits lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers;
the prohibition on corporations providing legal services; and the
prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law.25 There are also
rules indirectly related that, in sum and substance, are implicated
because their core concern is preventing conflicts, including ones
that may ensue if nonlawyers participated in the business of
providing legal services. These are the prohibition on conflicts of
interests and the duties of loyalty, zeal, and independent judgment.26 Finally, additional rules are also implicated, such as the
prohibition on multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) and the duty to
keep clients’ confidences.27 Combined, these rules prohibit nonlawyers from joining lawyers to offer legal services and lawyers from
raising equity from nonlawyers.
The concerns, discussed in more depth below, can be grouped into
three categories. The first relates to the underlying tenets of the
attorney-client relationship. Specifically, the core concerns are that
the financial interests of nonlawyers, who are not trained and licensed to practice law and are not bound by the rules of professional
responsibility, would create conflicts of interest, predominantly in
25. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT rr. 5.4(a), 5.4(d), 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
26. Id. at pmbl., rr. 1.7, 1.9.
27. Id. at rr. 1.6, 5.4.
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the form of a desire to maximize profits of the investors of the firm
at the expense of clients, and would restrict lawyers’ independent
judgment and their ability to loyally and zealously represent their
clients.28 The second category relates to attorneys’ roles and obligations as officers of the court, which include, for example, their
duty of candor towards the court.29 Such duties require attorneys to
prioritize the integrity of the justice system over their self-interest,
including their interest in maximizing profits.30 The third category
relates to the dignity and welfare of practicing attorneys and corresponding concerns that nonlawyer ownership or investment in
law firms may undermine both.31
Discontent with these prohibitions is as old as the prohibitions
themselves. Yet, to date—with the one exception of the new Arizona
regime—proponents of reform have been unable to overcome the
profession’s self-interest in a monopoly on the practice of law and to
offer a sufficiently compelling vision for how to preserve professional
standards should the monopoly be eliminated. This has led to repeating cycles of failed attempts at reform. These cycles, the rationales for reform, and the reason for the steadfast refusal to
reform the rules are explored in this Part.
A. History
The entwined prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law,
nonlawyer ownership of law firms, and sharing of fees have been
commonplace throughout the United States since at least the end of
the nineteenth century.32 And, to a large extent, the same objections
28. Arthur J. Ciampi, Non-Lawyer Investment in Law Firms: Evolution or Revolution?,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 23, 2012, at 1, 1-2; see also Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Management:
The Problem of Non-Lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593,
604 (1994).
29. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
30. See ABA CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., RECOMMENDATION 10F (2000) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION 10F], https://web.archive.org/web/20061012023914/http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/md
precom10f.html [https://perma.cc/HL2H-Q2XQ].
31. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 888-907 (1999); Andrew
Bruck & Andrew Canter, Note, Supply, Demand, and the Changing Economics of Large Law
Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2118-26 (2008); Deborah L. Rhode, Foreword: Personal
Satisfaction in Professional Practice, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 217, 220 (2008).
32. Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really
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to those prohibitions have been rehashed—with the same nonresult—for more than a hundred years. Later, we will see why the
present situation is different and not just another round of the
same tired fight.
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the prohibition of nonlawyer ownership of law firms has been affirmed by courts, state
legislatures, bar associations, and ethical codes. In re Co-Operative
Law Co. is a landmark case in that regard.33 The New York Court
of Appeals held that an 1899 criminal prohibition of unlicensed law
practice extended to a corporation formed by nonlawyers that
offered legal services to subscribers provided by “a staff of competent attorneys and counselors at law.”34 Among other things, the
court based its conclusion on the grounds that “an attorney employed by a corporation would be responsible to the corporation
rather than to the client of the corporation; ... the corporation might
be controlled wholly by nonlawyers and organized simply to make
money; [and] the public would have no remedy to protect itself from
the corporation.”35
New York’s approach was widely followed. By the late 1930s, the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law concluded in its review of practice that
“[p]robably nothing is better settled than that a corporation cannot
render legal services for or practice law in respect of the affairs of
another [even if] it do[es] so by employing a lawyer.”36
An important milestone in the regulation of the legal profession
was the ABA’s adoption of the first Canons of Professional Ethics
in 1908 (the Canons).37 The Canons were amended from time to
time over the subsequent decades, and in 1928 the ABA House of
Delegates adopted three new Canons which, with some modifications, have served as the template for all subsequent regulation
Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 159, 161-75;
Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold
Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580 & n.19 (1989).
33. See generally In re Coop. L. Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Andrews, supra note 32, at 581.
36. Report of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 62 ANN. REP.
AM. BAR ASS’N 769, 779 (1937).
37. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A Proposal for
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1998).
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of nonlawyer participation in the business of providing legal
services. Canon 33 ensured that all and only admitted attorneys
could form a partnership for the practice of law.38 Canon 34, after
being amended in 1937, flatly prohibited dividing legal fees with
nonlawyers.39 Finally, Canon 35 barred nonlawyers from serving
as employers of attorneys or as intermediaries.40
The next milestone in that development came in 1969, when
years of dissatisfaction with the Canons culminated in the adoption
by the ABA of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the
1969 Code).41 The 1969 Code ushered in the modern era in which
the model drafted by the ABA has become the rule in most, if not
all, jurisdictions.42 Although the Canons were substantially modified
by the new Model Code, the essence of the restrictions on lawyernonlawyer business associations did not change.
The 1969 Code was overhauled in the early 1980s, resulting in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), passed by
the ABA in 1983 and adopted in 49 out of 50 states since then.43 The
2016 version of Rule 5.4 provides that a lawyer or law firm shall not:
share legal fees with a nonlawyer; form a partnership with a nonlawyer if partnership activities include the practice of law; or allow
clients to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering legal services.44 A lawyer is also not allowed to practice if
a nonlawyer owns any interest in the practice, is a corporate director or another position of similar responsibility in the practice, or
if a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.45
Criticism of the restrictive norms are as old as the norms themselves, and several times over the decades a vocal minority of practitioners has attempted to reform the rules. They failed each time.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
42. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 56-57 (1986).
43. Adams & Matheson, supra note 37, at 8; see also Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions
Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_st
ate_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/GC3R-M8LU].
44. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
45. Id.
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At least one of the drafters of the Canons pointed out that the
emperor has no clothes when he remarked, in 1927, that “aside from
professional policy, I think that there is nothing inherently ‘unethical’ in the formation of partnerships between lawyers largely engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert engineer, student of
finance, or some other form of expert.”46 And the drafting committee
noted that “there is substantial difference of view in the profession
respecting its recommendations as to partnerships, division of fees,
intermediaries, and the bonding of lawyers.”47
The most thorough debate on the nonlawyer provisions accompanied the development of the 1983 Model Rules. Prior to the adoption of those rules, the ABA conducted a three-year study of the
existing rules and sought recommendations for revision.48 The ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak
Commission) recommended that “a lawyer may be employed by an
organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial
authority is exercised by a nonlawyer ... such as a business corporation” as long as the lawyer’s ability to adhere to her ethical duties
was in writing.49
It was the only recommendation from the Kutak Commission
rejected by the ABA.50
In 1998, the ABA established the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, which ultimately recommended to the House of Delegates that the Model Rules be amended to permit multidisciplinary
practices (MDPs).51 The Commission adopted the approach developed in Australia and the United Kingdom, which was to ensure
that individual lawyers were subject to the rules of professional
responsibility notwithstanding the type of entity in which they

46. F.W. Grinnell, Minority Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons
of Professional Ethics, 50 ANN. REP. AM. BAR ASS’N 387, 388 (1927).
47. Report of the Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics,
50 ANN. REP. AM. BAR ASS’N 372, 378 (1927).
48. Adams & Matheson, supra note 37, at 8.
49. Id. (quoting ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3 (Aug. 20,
1997)).
50. Id. at 9.
51. ABA COMM’N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRAC., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:
RECOMMENDATION (1999), https://web.archive.org/web/20000510230706/http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html [https://perma.cc/R8WE-JRBK].
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practiced or their employment relationship with nonlawyers.52 A
year later, the House of Delegates roundly rejected the Commission’s proposal and affirmed its commitment to the complete
exclusion of nonlawyers from the business of providing legal
services.53
In 2009, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 concluded that “the
Commission has undertaken a careful study of alternative law
practice structures. Based on the Commission’s extensive outreach,
research, consultation, and the response of the profession, there
does not appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a change
to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms.”54
The ABA reached a similar conclusion in 2016. In February of
that year, the House of Delegates adopted a resolution urging states
to consider the ABA’s own Model Regulatory Objectives for the
Provision of Legal Services when considering establishing or regulating non-traditional legal service providers. However, the House
of Delegates went on to declare that “nothing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any manner existing ABA policy prohibiting
non lawyer [sic] ownership of law firms.”55 Later that year, the ABA
Commission on the Future of Legal Services released an issues
paper on ABSs. In that paper, the Commission noted that there was
no evidence from the jurisdictions which permit them that ABSs
cause harm and also that those jurisdictions have not rolled back
permissions for ABSs. The paper invited comments on ABSs, but
ultimately the Commission did not introduce a resolution permitting
them. Rather, the Commission confined its final recommendations
to merely noting that continued exploration of the topic would be
useful.56

52. See infra Part III.A.3.
53. See RECOMMENDATION 10F, supra note 30.
54. Press Release, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will
Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr.
16, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/201204
16_news_release_re_nonlawyer_ownership_law_firms.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW8T-WN9Z].
55. ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 59 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
images/abanews/2016FLSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7CC-K3QK].
56. Id. at 42.
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B. The Concerns Underlying the Prohibition
Different segments of the legal profession have somewhat different concerns. At the elite end of the profession, occupied by socalled BigLaw firms, the concerns focus, broadly speaking, on the
perceived effects that nonlawyer participation may have on the
attorney-client relationship and on attorneys’ autonomy and welfare
in terms of controlling their careers, how they conduct individual
cases, and how many hours they work.57
At the other end of the spectrum are solo practitioners and small
firms. Their main concern is the fear of being wiped out, as independent businesses, by large corporations in the same manner that
mom-and-pop shops have been wiped out by the various megachains. Instead of owning their independent business, such practitioners fear that they will be relegated to a lesser professional
existence as line employees at the same corporations with little to
none of the dignity, independence, and control over their practices
they currently enjoy.58
There are also shared concerns held by those across the legal
profession independent of the size of one’s firm. In democratic societies, lawyers hold a special role as guardians of the rule of law,
and if that special role is put at risk, that is a concern for all lawyers
irrespective of the size of their practice. There are also more practical concerns held in common, like issues surrounding conflicts of
interest and duties of confidentiality, as nonlawyers may require
information sharing that conflicts with lawyers’ professional duties.59 These arguments are explored in more detail in the following
subsections.60
57. See infra Part I.B.1, I.B.3.
58. See infra Part I.B.2-3.
59. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
60. The writings on the topic are legion. For a good overview of the arguments for and
against reform, see generally ABA COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., ISSUES PAPER
CONCERNING NEW CATEGORIES OF LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDERS (2015) [hereinafter ABA ISSUES
PAPER]. For pieces which address some of the arguments for reform in more detail, see, for example, Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the
(Un)Corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 43-48 (2014); Kathleen Eleanor
Justice, Note, There Goes the Monopoly: The California Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179, 211-12 (1991); Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm
Organizational Form and Capitalization Structure, 78 MO. L. REV. 777, 783-90 (2013). For
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1. Preserving Trust and Deterring Conflicts
As every law student is instructed throughout law school, a lawyers’ role in society is founded on trust. This is true in the obvious
sense that clients must trust that their attorneys will adhere to
duties such as conducting a zealous representation and maintaining
confidentiality.61 But it is also true in the sense that legal services
are “credence goods”—goods that lay consumers, or even sophisticated ones, have difficulty evaluating even long after the service has
been rendered.62 Put in that way, much of the regulation of the legal
profession is aimed at producing trust in a situation in which it is
impossible for clients to know whether that trust is well placed. This
is reflected in the ABA’s definition of a profession, which provides
that because “clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the
service, they must trust those they consult.”63
By a significant margin, the most common category of justification for excluding nonlawyers from entities that offer legal services
stems from lawyers’ self-understanding that putting nonlawyers
into the mix will inevitably disrupt their ability to put clients’ interests ahead of all else. The idea here is that to do otherwise would
lead to the inevitable erosion of the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship.64
Two separate but related arguments fall under this category.
First, that the restrictions ensure that the trained and certified
attorney, and not any nonlawyer, is the one making legal decisions.
Second, that keeping nonlawyers out of the picture ensures that, in
exercising her judgment, an attorney will take into consideration
arguments against reform, see, for example, Michael Kelly, Comment, Ethical Issues Associated with Multidisciplinary Practices in Texas, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 733, 752-68 (2010); Alison
Frankel, Lawyers Remain Deeply Skeptical of Non-Lawyers Investing in Law Firms, LEGAL
BUS. ONLINE (May 18, 2016), https://www.legalbusinessonline.com/news/lawyers-remaindeeply-skeptical-non-lawyers-investing-law-firms/72364 [https://perma.cc/L6WV-GKGW].
61. See, e.g., GREGORY C. SISK, SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, NEIL W.
HAMILTON, WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, VINCENT R. JOHNSON, KATHERINE R. KRUSE, STEPHEN L.
PEPPER & MELISSA H. WERESH, LEGAL ETHICS, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 305-09, 475-76 (2018).
62. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 5-6 (2006).
63. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986).
64. See Ciampi, supra note 28.
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only the needs of the client. In this version, competing concerns such
as the economic bottom line of her employer could influence an
attorney to recommend a course of action that would be more profitable or otherwise beneficial for her but less than optimal for her
client. For example, she may recommend pursuing damages rather
than an injunction,65 or urge accepting an early and low settlement
for the benefit of a quarterly bottom line or as a way to redeploy the
investor’s capital.66
The Restatement captures this argument well, noting that “[a]
person entitled to share a lawyer’s fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer’s activities so as to maximize those fees. That
could lead to inadequate legal services.”67 The Restatement further
elaborates that “permitting such ownership or direction would induce or require lawyers to violate the mandates of the lawyer codes,
such as by subjecting the lawyer to the goals and interests of the
nonlawyer in ways adverse to the lawyer’s duties to a client.”68
The fear that liberalization of the legal profession would increase
conflicts of interest is brought to its logical extreme in the so-called
“Fear of Sears” or of the “Walmart-ization” of legal services—the
fear that doing so would lead retail giants to offer law as one of their
products.69 What if a client wanted to sue one of Walmart’s suppliers? Or what if she wanted to pursue a workers’ compensation or
union organizing claim that, although not directly related to Walmart, could result in a ruling enforceable against it—especially if
implementing the new rule would be costly? And could a Walmart
65. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 467-79
(2012) (explaining that in the Chevron-Ecuador environmental class action, the financier
required the indigent claimants to pay the Funder’s portion of any remedial measures ordered
by the court). On the positive externalities of litigation, see Steven Shavell, The Fundamental
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 575, 575 (1997).
66. Steinitz, supra note 65, at 501-503 (analogizing litigation finance to venture capital
and explaining, based on economic theory, why financiers may have economic incentives, as
well as contractual obligations, to liquidate investments in any given case and distribute or
redeploy funds from lawsuit to lawsuit irrespective of the needs of the case, in order to
maximize the profits of their own investors).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. b (AM. L. INST.
2000).
68. Id. § 10 cmt. c.
69. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES (2008); Adams & Matheson, supra note 37, at 3 & n.9.
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employee take the time and put in the creative effort that might be
required in any given case or transaction?
2. Professions and the Public Good
The ABA Commission on Professionalism concluded that an occupation constitutes a profession—in contrast with a business,
which is concerned with profit-maximization—when the client can
expect the practitioner to set aside their own self-interest in favor
of the client’s and the public’s interests.70 A profession is also
different than a business sector in that it subjects itself to selfregulation. The profession’s self-regulatory bodies are expected to
assure that its members are competent, do not violate clients’ trust,
and prioritize the clients’ interests over their own.71
Moreover, the attorney, as a member of the profession, is ultimately an officer of the court, unlike the businessperson. Thus, in
addition to serving her client, a lawyer performs the essential
function of supporting the smooth operation of the legal system:
“Professional lawyers ... were those who eschewed the mere ‘hired
gun’ mode of practice, and took more of a public or justice-regarding
stance, as befitted officers of the court.”72 According to the ABA, consistent with the self-understanding of many of the lawyers it represents, “[t]he law governing lawyers was developed to protect the
public interest and to preserve the core values of the legal profession, that are essential to the proper functioning of the American
justice system.”73 Because of this, lawyers are subjected to higher
standards (additional study, bar admission, character and fitness)
and more restriction (ethical rules); in return, they receive protection from the vicissitudes of the market.
Finally, some raise concerns that the imperatives of seeking returns for nonlawyer investors would decrease the time lawyers
spend on pro bono matters—a point of pride for the profession and
a tangible manifestation of its commitment to the public good.74
70. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 63, at 10.
71. Id.
72. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 1.08 (4th ed. 2019).
73. See RECOMMENDATION 10F, supra note 30.
74. See, e.g., Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Own-
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3. The Dignity of the Profession and the Welfare of the
Practitioners
Another version offers the view that being a licensed attorney is
an individual right, hard-won through years of arduous study and
examination, and in that sense is not capable of being shared or
divided with a nonlawyer. The court in In re Co-Operative Law Co.
took the view that the practice of law was a “personal right,”
granted to those possessing special qualifications and a moral character, rather than “a business open to all.”75 The court pointed out
that the profession had various qualification requirements that
limited its availability such as character requirements, certification,
educational requirements, and state examinations. “The right to
practice law,” the court said, “cannot be assigned or inherited, but
must be earned by hard study and good conduct.”76
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts went even further, noting:
In addition to adequate learning, [the practice of law] demands
on the part of the attorney undivided allegiance, a conspicuous
degree of faithfulness and disinterestedness, absolute integrity,
and utter renunciation of every personal advantage conflicting
in any way directly or indirectly with the interests of his client.
Only a human being can conform to these exacting requirements. Artificial creations such as corporations or associations
cannot meet these prerequisites.77

This individualistic view of the nature of law practice has become
embedded in the business model of law firms. As one commentator
observed, law firm partners are compensated on a percentage of annual profits and not with any permanent equity in the firm.78 This
can be traced back to the idea that the value of the firm is all and
only the contributions of individual lawyers/partners such that
when a lawyer leaves a firm or retires, the value that she contributed would leave with her. On that view, “law firms are inherently
ership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 55-56 (2016).
75. In re Coop. Law Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910).
76. Id.
77. In re Op. of the Justs., 194 N.E. 313, 316-17 (Mass. 1935).
78. Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms? A Corporate Finance Solution to
Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014).
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loose associations of individual service providers whose contributions to the firm do not last beyond their working years and who
should not own a piece of the firm after they leave.”79
In what could be considered a more modern view of the dignity of
the profession, some commentators express concern that attorneys’
job satisfaction and work-life balance may suffer if law practices
were run on the model of businesses, focused exclusively on profitmaximization and inflicted with short-termism.80 The worry is that
lawyers will be further pressed to increase the number of hours they
bill and restricted from exercising their judgment on what a case
truly calls for. Much of this criticism has centered on larger law
firms, which many feel have already become overly profit-oriented,
and, as a result, are pushing attorneys to work longer hours and
damaging associate satisfaction.81
II. THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION NORM IN AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW AND THE “GOLDMAN SACHS-IZATION” OF THE
PRACTICE OF LAW
Many of the objections to nonlawyer participation in law firms
share a common thread: that the concerns of clients and the justice
system will become subservient to those of the nonlawyers, especially if they are investors or owners (rather than managers or lowlevel employees). This Article argues for the first time that such
fears are justified, in significant part, for one central reason: arguably the fundamental norm of American corporate law is shareholder primacy.82 This is the notion that directors and managers
79. Id. at 14.
80. See generally Jarrod F. Reich, Capitalizing on Healthy Lawyers: The Business Case for
Law Firms to Promote and Prioritize Lawyer Well-Being, 65 VILL. L. REV. 361 (2020).
81. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, Corporations Don’t Have to Maximize Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2015, 6:46 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-corpora
tions-obligations-to-shareholders/corporations-dont-have-to-maximize-profits [https://perma.
cc/Q4PP-F8L4]; Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV.
1951, 1954-55 (2018) (explaining that shareholder primacy is ubiquitous throughout corporate
law and that courts in the last century have endorsed wealth maximization as corporate
managers’ guiding objective); N. Craig Smith & David Rönnegard, Shareholder Primacy,
Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools, 134 J. BUS. ETHICS 463,
465-66 (2016) (same). The argument herein stands whether managers follow the norm
because it is law, strictly speaking, or because it is an overpowering social norm.
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have a fiduciary duty to maximize value for their shareholders, even
at the expense of other worthy goals and stakeholders.83 As the
following paragraphs will show, the tension between shareholder
primacy, on the one hand, and the ethical obligations and publicinterest commitments of lawyers, on the other, is quite real and
pronounced. In that sense, the concerns underlying nonlawyer
participation in providing legal services can be restated as a classic
question of corporate governance: how to deal with the separation
of ownership (or the financial interests of the investors) and control
(which is in the hands of the managers of the firm, which frequently
will not be the investors themselves).84
A. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
In shareholder-focused corporate governance systems such as
the American one, directors’ and managers’ fiduciary obligations run
to the company and its shareholders only. The fundamental elements of the shareholder primacy model are that ultimate control
of the corporation (at least de jure if not de facto) rests with the
shareholders; corporate managers manage in the interests of these
shareholders; the interests of other corporate constituencies (such
as employees and customers) are protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate
governance; the minority shareholders are entitled to strong protections from exploitation by controlling shareholders; and the

83. The literature and jurisprudence on the topic are legion. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001);
Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1267-68 (1999); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676-77 (2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders
Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1799 (2006).
84. The problem is that the managers of the entity—who are conceptually employees of
the shareholders—have greater control over the business’s resources and decisions than do
the actual owners. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3-5, 64-67 (rev. ed. 1968). Here, the problem is the
inverse of the usual one. Usually, the challenge is to ensure managers manage according to
shareholder interests. Here, the challenge is to guard managers’ ability to manage to the
benefit of the clients and courts, irrespective of the investors’ economic interests.
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market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the
principal measure of its shareholder’s interests.85
Other bedrock principles and doctrines of American corporate
law—such as the business judgment rule,86 according to which
courts defer to the judgment of the directors, and the Revlon Doctrine,87 according to which when a sale or break up of a company is
inevitable the singular responsibility of the board is to secure the
highest price available—can all be traced back to this basic
principle.
This paradigm (and the corporate form more generally) has been
a “brilliant legal technology that allowed entities to raise large sums
of money from disaggregated investors,”88 thus enabling the modern
economy we know and depend on today. Further, some leading
scholars have argued not only for the normative superiority of the
shareholder primacy paradigm but also, descriptively, that the legal
systems of the world have converged on shareholder primacy as the
organizing principle of corporate governance and that “[t]here is
[descriptively] no longer any serious competitor to the [normative]
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase longterm shareholder value.”89 This has been dubbed—consistent with
the triumphalist zeitgeist of the brief unipolar American-led moment that followed the fall of the Soviet Union—“the end of history
for corporate law.”90
It should be clear from the above summary (simplified though it
might be) that a model which gives sole recognition to one set of
interests—the shareholders’ profit—is incompatible with lawyers’
obligations to safeguard the interests of their clients, the courts,
and the public. To put a fine point on it, a lawyer working (hypothetically) in a corporation organized on the shareholder primacy
model who, for instance, counseled a client to take a small settlement instead of a larger potential payout at trial, or to request an
85. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 83, at 440-41.
86. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
87. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184-85 (Del. 1986).
88. FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE: PURSUING
PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 2 (2018).
89. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 83, at 439.
90. Id.
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injunction instead of damages, could put herself and her corporate
superiors in legal jeopardy. Courts enforcing norms of shareholder
primacy have been hostile to decisions prioritizing any other interests. The seminal case in point is the 1919 Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., in which the Michigan Supreme Court enjoined Henry Ford
from operating the Ford Motor Company in a charitable manner for
the benefit of his employees or customers rather than strictly to
maximize the profits of its shareholders.91
These problems that shareholder primacy poses for the exercise
of lawyers’ ethical obligations are compounded by the phenomenon
of short-termism wherein a firm is so focused on generating profits
in the immediate term (often, to meet a quarterly goal, including
ones upon which bonuses are based) that it makes decisions that
harm its long-term prospects. Short-termism is prevalent among
players in the hedge fund and private equity spaces—the same
players who might be expected to invest in commercial law firms.92
The worry, then, is that law firms will be pressured to contribute to
their investors’ bottom lines—for example, by settling a case before
the fiscal year is over and bonuses are calculated, underinvesting
in a lawsuit, settling early so that the investor can redeploy cash to
other investments, and avoiding nonmonetary relief, to name a few
examples—at the expense of the clients. In a letter submitted in
December 2020 by Lawyers for Civil Justice and the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform to the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, the two organizations claimed that “each and every
funding agreement that has made its way into the record before the
Advisory Committee contains provisions permitting substantial
control or influence over the funded litigation.”93
91. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). A more recent example of this is eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34-35 (Del. Ch. 2010).
92. For an overview of short-termism and the current debate about whether it is harmful,
see generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds when the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE
L.J. 1870 (2017); Jonathan Macey, Their Bark Is Bigger Than Their Bite: An Essay on Who
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite, 126 YALE L.J.F. 526 (2017); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Don’t Let the
Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/
01/dont-let-the-short-termism-bogeyman-scare-you [https://perma.cc/TD7E-4EZY].
93. Letter from Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr., President, Laws. for Civ. Just. & Harold Kim,
President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Sec’y of the Comm.
on Rules of Prac. & Pro., Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.uscourts.
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This prevalence can probably be explained, at least in part, by the
fact that often lawyers have a one-time relationship with their
clients whereas they are repeat players with a small universe of
funders. As the market moves from funding single cases to funding
portfolios (especially using revolving credit facilities) and direct
funding of law firms, the relationship between lawyers and funders
becomes even closer, changing from repeat-play to continuous. All
in all, other than in the case of very large, repeat-play clients who
provide a significant and ongoing source of revenue for the firm (a
scenario only likely to exist in corporate law firms and even then,
only with respect to their largest clients), given human nature,
funders’ interests will probably exert more pull than those of the
clients. The fear that law firms will be managed solely for the profit
of their shareholders, with little regard to the interests of clients,
the courts, or the public, can be thought of as the fear of the “Goldman Sachs-ization,” of legal services (alluding to the effects that
switching from a partnership model to a publicly traded company
had on the investment bank Goldman Sachs).94
B. Shareholder Primacy’s Discontents and the Rise of Benefit
Entities
But not everyone, either in the United States or in other market
economies, shares the view that shareholder primacy is the end of
history for corporate law, either descriptively or normatively.95 The
worldview that corporate purpose is, or should be, broader than
maximizing shareholder value has a long history in capitalism and
gov/sites/default/files/20-cv-ii_suggestion_from_lcj_and_ilr_-_third_party_litigation_ funding_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HRT-KRU9].
94. See generally STEVEN G. MANDIS, WHAT HAPPENED TO GOLDMAN SACHS: AN INSIDER’S
STORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DRIFT AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (2013).
95. For descriptions of the approaches in other jurisdictions see, for example, Ruth V.
Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447, 447-48 (2003); Timothy M. Devinney,
Joachim Schwalbach & Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Governance: Comparative Perspectives, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE 413, 414 (2013). For normative
critiques see, for example, LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15-19 (2019); COLIN
MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE
TRUST IN IT 15-57 (2013).
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is as authentically American as the alternative. In the early twentieth century, industrial magnates had a key role in the Progressive
movement as they joined the push for greater government regulations and supported, together with unions, reforms in areas such as
workers’ compensation and child labor laws.96 The support for such
reforms that improved the lives of everyday Americans stemmed
from an understanding that the acceptance and ultimate success of
capitalism depended on a wide distribution of the fruits of the
system and that it was in the self-interest of businesses to support
policies that may be costly in the short term but would ultimately
strengthen the system in the long term. These moderate, pragmatic
views of corporate leaders persisted well into the postwar era.97
This is no coincidence given that historically, until the emergence
of a norm of freedom of incorporation, in the mid-nineteenth century, corporations were public institutions that received a charter
from the state to incorporate in order to pursue a public purpose
such as building railways and utilities.98 Echoes of this history persist and are evident in current-day markets for social responsibility.99 One need only look to the success of the fair-trade movement,
socially responsible investment funds and strategies, and the proliferation of environmentally sound products for examples of consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for socially conscious goods.100
Whereas traditional economic analysis assumes that shareholders
are interested only in maximizing the monetary value of their
shares, examples to the contrary abound and can be seen, for example, in the popularity of socially conscious investment funds that
eschew investments in repressive regimes or harmful products such
96. James Surowiecki, Moaning Moguls, NEW YORKER (June 30, 2014) (quoting Mark
Mizruchi), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/07/moaning-moguls [https://perma.
cc/7PPZ-R7D2]; see also Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Concepts and Practices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19,
19-21 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
97. Surowiecki, supra note 96; Carroll, supra note 96, at 19-21.
98. Will Hutton, Colin Mayer & Philippe Schneider, The Rights and Wrongs of Shareholder Rights, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2017).
99. M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Capitalism 2.0, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2008, 11:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0310/030.html?sh=3edc241266a2 [https://perma.cc/
84AE-43UK]); see also MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL
JUSTICE 134-35 (2019).
100. Henderson & Malani, supra note 99; see also STEINITZ, supra note 99, at 134-35.
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as tobacco. “In 2005 these funds had $2.3 trillion in assets, 10% of
all U.S. assets under management. These funds average a return 35
basis points less than comparable nonfiltered funds, meaning that
investors put a value of at least $84 billion per year on steering
capital to firms that do good.”101
Normatively, some proponents of this alternative view of corporate purpose, “stakeholder primacy,” have gone so far as to argue that a corporate person (corporation) that seeks to maximize
shareholder value alone is akin to a sociopath: “shareholder-value
thinking causes corporate managers to focus myopically on shortterm earnings reports at the expense of long-term performance;
discourages investment and innovation; harms employees, customers, and communities; and causes companies to indulge in reckless,
sociopathic, and socially irresponsible behaviors. It threatens the
welfare of consumers, employees, communities, and investors
alike.”102
And ironically, the absolute reign of shareholder primacy in
recent decades meant that while it was the “brilliant legal technology that allowed entities to raise large sums of money from
disaggregated investors,”103 it was simultaneously holding back
lawyers, as professionals, from being able to do the same out of fear
that they would focus exclusively on profit maximization to the
detriment of their clients and the rule of law.
There is some evidence that the zeitgeist within corporate
America is shifting again. In April 2019:
Nearly 200 chief executives, including the leaders of Apple,
Pepsi and Walmart, tried ... to redefine the role of business in
society—and how companies are perceived by an increasingly
skeptical public.
Breaking with decades of long-held corporate orthodoxy, the
Business Roundtable issued a statement on “the purpose of a
corporation,” arguing that companies should no longer advance
only the interests of shareholders. Instead, the group said, they

101. Henderson & Malani, supra note 99; see also STEINITZ, supra note 99, at 134-35.
102. STOUT, supra note 95, at vi.
103. ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 2.
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must also invest in their employees, protect the environment
and deal fairly and ethically with their suppliers.104

It is against this backdrop that the movement advocating that
deviations from shareholder primacy be permitted and facilitated
by corporate law is best understood. The first attempt to moderate
the common law rule of shareholder primacy in response to corporate social responsibility, commencing some thirty years ago, was
the so-called Constituency Statutes—laws that permit, but do not
require, a board of directors to consider the interests of constituencies—persons or groups—other than shareholders in performing
their duties.105 Thirty-three states have adopted such statutes.106
While these statutes did not bring about an apocalypse of increased litigation, diminishment of stock value, or deterrence of
investment,107 as some predicted, they also failed to meaningfully
enhance social and environmental responsibility by corporations.108
Constituency Statutes can now be best understood as a social experiment of limited success on its own terms that nonetheless
served as an evolutionary step towards today’s benefit entities.
These arrived on the scene when, as part of the growing and
globalizing corporate social responsibility movement, activists
developed and advocated the adoption of a Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL).109
In a nutshell, when a state adopts a version of the MBCL, it
enables corporations created under the state’s general corporation
104. David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top
C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/busi
ness-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/937B-ZN2F]; see also Andrew Ross
Sorkin, How Shareholder Democracy Failed the People, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/business/dealbook/business-roundtable-corporate-responsibility.
html [https://perma.cc/7UGG-NX7J].
105. Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional
Investing when Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2015).
106. Id. at 94.
107. See id. at 127; Roberta Romano, Comment, What Is the Value of Other Constituency
Statutes to Shareholders?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 537 (1993); Comm. on Corp. L., Other
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2253-54 (1990).
108. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 120-23; ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 160-61.
109. BENEFIT CORP., MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (2017) [hereinafter MBCL], https://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ UB3B-PBDU].
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law to opt into becoming a “benefit corporation” under the new
statutory provisions.110 And this status, in turn, means such
corporations are required to pursue social or environmental goals.111
Otherwise stated, in a benefit corporation, directors are required to
consider the impact of their decisions on all stakeholders.112
Maryland enacted the first statute following the MBCL in 2010,
and as of today, thirty-seven states have adopted some version of
benefit corporation legislation.113 Some states have enacted statutes
aligning closely with the MBCL.114 Other states, however, have
followed Delaware’s more relaxed standards.115 In addition, some
states allow for the creation of benefit limited liability corporations,
which are more flexible than corporations.116
It is vital to understand the incompatibility of shareholder
primacy with lawyers’ ethical obligations and public commitments
in light of the fact that nonlawyer participation in providing legal
services is here and likely to stay. And, so far, the forms it has taken
do not directly address that incompatibility. Legal Benefit Entities
(LBEs), by contrast, would be governed by stakeholder primacy,
referring to the supremacy of lawyers’ obligation to the court system, as officers of the court, and their traditional fiduciary duties
to clients.

110. Id. § 101.
111. Id.
112. Id. Shareholders are, of course, owners of a corporation’s common or preferred stock,
whereas the term stakeholders refers to any of the constituencies that a corporation’s
activities and decisions may impact, such as employees, local businesses, the surrounding
community, or even global citizens who ultimately internalize a corporation’s environmental
or social footprint.
113. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 (LexisNexis 2021); State by State
Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-statestatus [https://perma.cc/L2VW-7A64].
114. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600-31 (West 2021); FLA. STAT. §§ 607.601-.613 (2021);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1 to 40/5.01 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2021);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701-09 (McKinney 2021); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2021).
115. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361-68 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501 to
-509 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-72a01 to -72a09 (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.16-210
(West 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101 to -109 (2021); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§§ 21.951-.959 (West 2021).
116. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1201 to -1208 (2021); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS §§ 4A-1201 to -1208 (LexisNexis 2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.754 (2019); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 8891-98 (2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-101 to -402 (LexisNexis 2021).
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The next Part will outline developments that have ushered in
both de facto and de jure nonlawyer participation in providing legal
services and show how they fall short of resolving that fundamental
tension (although one model, Arizona’s new regulatory regime,
comes close). The final Part will then discuss how requiring businesses that wish to provide legal services to organize as benefit
entities bypasses shareholder primacy in favor of stakeholder
primacy and so solves the underlying problem.
III. FAIT ACCOMPLI—NONLAWYER PARTICIPATION IN LAW FIRMS
IS A REALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The reality in the United States is that many lawyers have been
practicing law within corporations for decades, since the in-house
counsel revolution,117 and that, increasingly, nonlawyers invest in
and participate in the management of the practice of law here as
well. The dam has fully broken, though, with the rise, mainstreaming, and evolution of both de facto and de jure approaches to nonlawyer participation in providing legal services.
As litigation finance has transitioned to law firm finance, the
industry has de facto established nonlawyer participation in providing legal services. Initially, such nonlawyer financiers transacted
only with clients so as not to run afoul of the fee-sharing prohibition.
Increasingly, those financiers are contracting directly with law
firms, providing financing to pursue portfolios of cases, or simply
financing firms’ operations more broadly.118 Such funders often
receive privileged information about the funded lawsuits under
broad interpretations of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine, provide legal advice, select and direct legal representation, and influence or even control settlements.119
117. See David B. Wilkins, Is the In-House Counsel Movement Going Global? A Preliminary
Assessment of the Role of Internal Counsel in Emerging Economies, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 251,
251-65 (describing the in-house counsel movement in the United States and Western Europe).
118. See, e.g., Solutions: Portfolio & Law Firm Financing, VALIDITY FIN., https://validityfinance.com/legal-finance/solutions/portfolio-law-firm-financing/ [https://perma.cc/3XXK-G4
AF] (“[B]ecause our investment is with the firm not in the cases, firm management can choose
to use capital for broader strategic purposes—such as hiring lateral lawyers, expanding offices
into new markets or covering fixed fee overruns.”).
119. On control of attorneys, litigation budgets, and settlement decisions by third-party
funders see, for example, Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance
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Further, funders are influencing decisions that would have once
been taken by the partnership without nonlawyers’ influence such
as recruitment and the selection and development of practice areas.120 The proliferation of portfolio financing has caught the attention of and received scrutiny from the NYCBA which, while
affirming the practice is inconsistent with New York’s fee-sharing
prohibition, has proposed reforms that amount to a disclosure
regime.121
Meanwhile, nonlawyer participation has arrived, de jure, in
Arizona effective January 1, 2021. There, the Supreme Court of
Arizona abolished the fee-sharing and related prohibitions and
replaced them with a robust regulatory regime that creates a new
kind of business entity that is subject to extensive licensing and
reporting requirements, and which must abide by the obligations of
legal ethics.122
All of these developments are examined in the subsequent Sections.
Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV. 711, 722 (2014); see also Steinitz, supra note 65, at 467-79 (describing the litigation finance arrangement in the Chevron-Ecuador litigation which authorized financiers to select lawyers and supervise key litigation decisions and information
rights); Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How Investors Back Lawsuits,
FORBES (July 6, 2011, 7:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/07/litiga
tion-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/2LJC-CAJY]. On
provision of legal advice, consider how Chilmark Partners, a corporate bankruptcy advisory
firm that recently formed a joint venture with the largest third-party financier, describes its
“litigation consulting” services:
We employ our financial expertise to fashion powerful testimony and insightful advice in complex disputes, whether in litigation in court or in negotiated settlements.
We have assisted counsel with ... [c]rafting economic arguments in support of
client’s case[;] [d]rafting of discovery requests and review of production[;] [r]eview[ing], analyz[ing], and critiqu[ing] opposing arguments and testimony[;]
[a]ssisting counsel during depositions[;] [a]d hoc analysis as requested by counsel[;] [p]reparation of expert reports[; and] [l]ive testimony.
Litigation Consulting, CHILMARK PARTNERS, https://www.chilmarkpartners.com/services/
litigation/ [https://perma.cc/7U7H-HKNH].
120. See, e.g., Press Release, Omni Bridgeway, supra note 4 (“We help [firms] recruit talent,
launch a promising new litigation specialty, or provide a safety net for their own risks, allowing them to pursue new cases. In short, we help incubate firms and practice groups.”); see
also Law Firm Financing, OMNI BRIDGEWAY, https://omnibridgeway.com/litigation-funding/
law-firm-financing [https://perma.cc/Y4DR-8LVS] (describing services provided by Omni
Bridgeway, formerly Bentham IMF).
121. See infra Part III.C.
122. See infra Part III.E.
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A. Antecedents
The rise of litigation finance and its ongoing transformation into
law firm finance is the biggest and most systemic challenge to the
traditional prohibition of nonlawyer participation in law firms. But
before turning to that phenomenon, this Section examines several
other indicators that the traditional rule has been fatally weakened
by facts on the ground.
1. From Partnerships to Limited Liability Companies
The first of these may seem unremarkable today, but the ability
of law firms to organize as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) is a
recent and revolutionary development. The LLC is a flexible business form that combines advantages of the corporate form, predominantly limited liability, with those of partnerships, predominantly
pass-through taxation.123 Because skepticism about whether benefit
entities are likely to become heavily adopted might lead readers of
this proposal to doubt the feasibility of a reform of law firms’ organization and governance that is premised on such adoption, it is
worth recounting the remarkable but unheralded rise of the LLC in
some detail. The LLC revolution:
began modestly with the Wyoming LLC Statute.... [Enacted in
1975 by] William Carney, who observed this development as a
young law professor in Wyoming, reflected twenty years later
that the statute seemed to be just a special vehicle for oil and
gas companies, so unheralded that he heard about it only after
it was passed.... [Carney dismissed the development in a footnote, describing] it as an amalgam of corporate, limited partnership, and general partnership provisions that “leaves more
questions unanswered than it solves, and for that reason alone
does not represent a viable alternative for most enterprises.” ...
By 1988 only one other state (Florida in 1982) had adopted an
LLC statute.

123. Heather Huston, How to Form an LLC, What Is an LLC, Advantages, Disadvantages
& More, WOLTERS KLUWER (July 29, 2021), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-in
sights/how-to-form-an-llc-what-is-an-llc-advantages-disadvantages-and-more [https://perma.
cc/L8GV-CE4B].
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However, the floodgates opened in 1988, and by 1994 all but
three states had adopted LLC statutes. This LLC Revolution
occurred despite the reluctance of courts, state lawmakers, and
federal tax authorities to sanction a new business form.124

This account continues to generalize that the “LLC Revolution”
shows that many of the impediments to the development of a new
business form that theorists foresaw, namely “conservatism of the
common law courts, lawmakers’ lack of incentives to experiment,
and firms’ concerns about interstate acceptance of new forms—were
actually mirages. By tinkering with agreements and provoking court
decisions, lawyers could drive the development of business forms.”125
Like other businesses, law firms have been flocking to the LLC
form.126 Permitting law firms to organize as LLCs (rather than
requiring that they form general partnerships) has had a profound
influence on the profession.127 Most importantly, by eliminating the
joint and several liability of partners in a general partnership, it
paved the way to the supersizing and the globalization of law firms,
as lawyers now felt comfortable practicing with other lawyers they
barely knew and could not monitor.128
2. Nontraditional Legal Service Providers
Another notable development, and the one that establishes the
most direct competition to law firms, is the (re)entrance of the “Big
Four” accounting firms into the business of providing legal advice.
The major accounting firms (formerly, the “Big Eight”) first tried to
penetrate the American legal services sector in the late 1990s and
early 2000s but these efforts stalled—in retrospect, only temporarily—in the aftermath of the Enron scandal which exposed leading
accounting firms’ failures as ethics gatekeepers.129 But a decade or
124. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 119-20 (2010) (footnotes omitted) (quoting William J. Carney, Close Corporations and the Wyoming Business Corporation
Act: Time for a Change?, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 537, 581 (1977)).
125. Id. at 121-22.
126. Allison Martin-Rhoades, Robert W. Hillman & Peter Tran, Law Firms’ Entity Choices
Reflect Appeal of Newer Business Forms, BUS. ENTITIES, July/Aug. 2014, at 16, 18.
127. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 124, at 127-28.
128. Id. at 127.
129. See Tzahi Sarousi, The CPA’s March Towards Law Firms: The Change of Statuesque
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so later, with the memories of the Enron-era scandals receding,
economic rationales prevail and the big accounting firms are back
in the game.130 Researchers who study the sector have concluded
that “as impressive as their expansion has been over the last decade
... there are good reasons to believe that the Big Four will be even
more successful in penetrating the corporate legal services market
in the decades to come.”131 One of these accounting firms, PwC,
made headlines in 2017 with its plans to become the first of its
cohort to open a U.S. law firm, in Washington, D.C., by creating a
separate legal entity dedicated to providing legal services.132
The Big Four are not the only businesses to have launched law
firm affiliates. Already in 2008, the cofounders of the publicly traded
litigation finance firm Juridica Investments set up both a litigation
funding firm and a feeder law firm, Fields & Scrantom, that represented cases funded by Juridica.133 The model was replicated in
2015 and 2016 by leading litigation finance firms Burford Capital
and Bentham IMF (now Omni Bridgeway), both of which launched
affiliate law firms.134
Another firm that looked to disrupt the traditional law firm model was the D.C. law firm Atrium. While it would eventually shutter
its doors in March 2020, the legal start-up Atrium replicated the
Between Law Firms and Accounting Firms, LEGAL BUS. WORLD (June 25, 2018), https://www.
legalbusinessworld.com/post/2018/06/25/the-cpas-march-towards-law-firms-the-change-ofstatuesque-between-law-firms-and-accountin [https://perma.cc/U5FU-T926].
130. Id.
131. David B. Wilkins & Maria J. Esteban Ferrer, The Integration of Law into Global Business Solutions: The Rise, Transformation, and Potential Future of the Big Four Accountancy
Networks in the Global Legal Services Market, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 981, 982 (2018).
132. Olson, supra note 10.
133. Juridica stopped making new investments in 2015. Sara Randazzo, Litigation Funding
Pioneer Hits a Roadblock, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2015, 12:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/BL-LB-52601 [https://perma.cc/4XWV-XDFG]. The company was then liquidated in 2018.
Michelle McGagh, Struggling Establishment and Juridica Reach End of the Road, CITYWIRE
(Nov. 23, 2018), https://citywireamericas.com/news/struggling-establishment-and-juridicareach-end-of-the-road/a1178650?section=investment-trust-insider [https://perma.cc/AX74RFNA]. See generally Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L.
REV. 405, 438-39 (2017).
134. See Sahani, supra note 133, at 408-09, 438-39; see also supra note 120 and
accompanying text; Seth Sandronsky, Under Foreign Non-Lawyer Ownership Rules, U.S.
Litigation Funder Opens Law Firm in London, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://legal
newsline.com/stories/511019541-under-foreign-non-lawyer-ownership-rules-u-s-litigationfunder-opens-law-fi [https://perma.cc/3N99-CUPD].
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avant-garde business model of the now-extinct firm, Clearspire. In
both ill-fated attempts, two entities were set up, one a law firm and
another an entity that created and maintained proprietary IT used
by the law firm, all backed up by venture capital (that is, nonlawyer
funding and ownership).135
3. Global Competitive Forces: The British (and Australians)
Are Coming!
In the coming years, global competitive pressures created by
ABSs overseas and related developments will likely exert additional
pressure on the market for legal services in the United States,
making it highly unlikely that the profession will be able to retrench
and return to the forceful prohibition of nonlawyer participation in
providing legal services. In fact, with its new regime, Arizona can
be seen as the first through the floodgates of a new era of the
practice of law in America.136
Litigation finance, discussed in detail below, provides a compelling, recent example of how competitive pressures can serve to import reforms to the profession into the United States from abroad
(and in particular from the United Kingdom).
The United Kingdom and Australia (among other jurisdictions)
allow robust participation of nonlawyers in providing legal services—this could have an effect on the entrenched norms of professional responsibility in the United States.137 This is especially so
given that these global forces are converging with the COVID-19
pandemic which may further catalyze changes and innovation as did
the financial crisis in 2008, which increased the need for new
sources of finance and clients and amplified global competitive
pressures. The COVID-19 pandemic with, among other things, the
changes it forced in terms of remote work and the attendant
dispersal of the workforce, is leading to a reimagining of the practice
of law on a scale not seen in living memory.

135. Robert Ambrogi, Is ‘Revolutionary’ Law Firm Atrium a Case of Clearspire Déjà Vu?,
ABOVE THE L. (Sept. 18, 2017, 3:29 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/is-revolutionarylaw-firm-atrium-a-case-of-clearspire-deja-vu/ [https://perma.cc/38J4-AGRD].
136. See infra Part III.E.
137. See Robinson, supra note 74, at 12-14.
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Nonlawyer participation in the provision of legal services has, in
one form or another, been on the books in the United Kingdom for
more than twenty-five years.138 The change, however, is more conventionally attributed to the passage of the Legal Services Act of
2007, which for the first time allowed nonlawyers to acquire a
financial interest in law firms, including through listing law firms
on stock exchanges.139 It also authorized lawyers and nonlawyers to
participate together in a business to provide legal services. ABSs
are now permitted to operate with some restrictions.140 For instance,
all employees of a legal services provider (lawyers and nonlawyers
alike) are subject to the rules of professional responsibility of
lawyers.141 In non-law firm businesses that provide some form of legal services, at least one manager must be a lawyer and is tasked
with ensuring that professional standards are upheld.142
Although the newly permitted practice of taking law firms public
got off to a slow start—the first firm did not list until 2015—there
are signs of acceleration.143 Recently, a fifth law firm announced its
intention to go public.144 In addition to the publicly traded firms, the
most recently available numbers show that more than 1,200 have
registered as Alternative Business Structures.145 In Australia, reforms relating to nonlawyer participation in law firms were also
spurred by concerns about anticompetitive practices.146 In the mid1990s, Australia substantially overhauled its approach to competition policy.147 As a result, Australian states began to permit
138. See id. at 18 & n.73.
139. See id. at 5, 18.
140. Id. at 18.
141. Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Globalization for the Professional Status of Lawyers
in the United States and Elsewhere, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 226 (2012).
142. Id.
143. See Kate Burgess, Pace of Law Firm IPOs Is Ponderous as Investors Kept at Bay, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/59185fac-17db-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640
[https://perma.cc/BL38-KCBT]; James Booth, “Stars Aligning” for Boom in Law Firm IPOs
in White Hot London Market, FIN. NEWS (May 6, 2021, 1:16 PM), https://www.fnlondon.com/
articles/stars-aligning-for-boom-in-law-firm-ipos-in-white-hot-london-market-20210506
[https://perma.cc/Q42L-P2BH].
144. Booth, supra note 143.
145. Register of Licensed Bodies (ABS), SOLICS. REGUL. AUTH., https://sra.org.uk/solicitors/
firm-based-authorisation/abs/abs-search.page [https://perma.cc/8NYE-FT6N].
146. See Robinson, supra note 74, at 28-29.
147. About the National Competition Policy, NAT’L COMPETITION COUNCIL, http://ncp.ncc.
gov.au/pages/about [https://perma.cc/23R8-SB7H].
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nonlawyer investment in law firms.148 One of the early adopters, the
first law firm to ever go public, was Slater & Gordon, a personal
injury firm in Victoria.149
As the 2016 ABA Commission acknowledged, the sky has not
fallen in either the United Kingdom or Australia.150 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, other jurisdictions are now following suit.
B. De Facto Nonlawyer Participation in Law Firms—Litigation
Finance
Litigation finance practices have already, de facto, diminished
the effect of the prohibition on nonlawyer participation in the business of providing legal services. They have done so following the
same model as the successful unraveling of the norms prohibiting
third parties from profiting from another’s lawsuit. Within the span
of the last decade, third-party funding, regarded by both opponents
and proponents as the most significant contemporary development
in civil justice,151 has gone from being a crime, a tort, and an ethical
violation to a mainstream practice.152
Like nonlawyer participation, reforms to the profession allowing
litigation finance began abroad. In both the United Kingdom and
148. Robinson, supra note 74, at 28-29.
149. See generally John C. Coates, Ashish Nanda & Monet A. Brewerton, Slater & Gordon
(A), HARV. L. SCH. CASE STUDY, 10-07, at 1, 3-4; John C. Coates, Ashish Nanda & Monet A.
Brewerton, Slater & Gordon (B), HARV. L. SCH. CASE STUDY, 12-11, at 1, 1-3; Richard Ackland,
Stock Market Crash: How Slater and Gordon Became a Casualty of the Neoliberal Dream, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/
10/stockmarket-crash-how-slater-and-gordon-became-a-casualty-of-the-neoliberal-dream
[https://perma.cc/U2GL-7AUJ].
150. See ABA ISSUES PAPER, supra note 60, at 7 n.49.
151. See generally GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, NEIL RICKMAN, JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, FRED
KIPPERMAN, JAMIE MORIKAWA & KATE GIGLIO, RAND CORP., THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceed
ings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VG7-66X2]; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION 1-6 (2012), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/
2020/10/TPLF_Solutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BE-C64Y].
152. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286-1301 (2011); Thomas J. Salerno & Jordan A. Kroop, Third-Party
Litigation Funding: Where Do We Go Now?, 37 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18-19 (2018); David
R. Glickman, Embracing Third-Party Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043, 1051-54
(2016).
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Australia, concerns that the self-regulation of lawyers was
anticompetitive led to massive reforms in the 1990s and 2000s.153
Changes to champerty laws—which govern litigation finance—in
Australia and the United Kingdom at the turn of the millennium
caused such competitive pressures on U.S.-based firms that they
effectively felled the centuries-old champerty doctrine, which
prohibited third-party litigation funding.154 In less than a decade,
champerty went from an entrenched red line for lawyers to a
concern of the past.
New York-based megafirms, which directly compete with London’s “Magic Circle” firms, were disadvantaged by not being able to
offer the same third-party financing as their London competitors.155
Worse yet, the London firms developed their advantage just as the
financial crisis of 2008 shrunk corporate litigation budgets, causing
severe ripple effects in American BigLaw.156 The market-based solution was obvious: allow New York firms to compete by looking the
other way or expressly approving of third-party funding.
Third-party funding’s breakthrough was premised on contracting
with clients, not with lawyers, who generally agreed that a direct
engagement between a funder and a lawyer/law firm would be held
not only as champertous, but also as violative of the fee-sharing
prohibition, the conflict rules, and the duties of loyalty and independent judgment.157
But in the past couple of years, the emboldened industry, which
has increasingly gained explicit acceptance in the form of favorable
court rulings and bar opinions,158 has evolved from contracting
exclusively with clients and providing largely passive investments
to active investing—that is, taking control of litigation—and to
153. See Steinitz, supra note 152, at 1278.
154. See id. at 1281.
155. See id.
156. See Rachel Rothwell, 2008 Crash Offers Glimpse of Our Future, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE
(May 11, 2020), https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/commentary-and-opinion/2008-crash-offers-glim
pse-of-our-future/5104203.article [https://perma.cc/H4M5-AY8A].
157. See Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course,
31 VT. L. REV. 615, 618 (2007).
158. See Nathan Crystal, Litigation Finance: An Overview of Issues and Current
Developments (Part I), 28 S.C. LAW. 12, 12 (2017). The Minnesota Supreme Court is the most
recent to join the national trend to abolish or limit champerty. See Maslowski v. Prospect
Funding Partners LLC, 944 N.W.2d 235, 236 (Minn. 2020).
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contracting directly with lawyers and firms.159 Third-party funders
directly contract with law firms by financing portfolios of cases, establishing lending facilities, and accepting anticipated, contingencybased legal fees as collateral.160
For example, Omni Bridgeway, one of the market leaders, recently announced that it had “begun to provide funding to law firms
based on their existing track record and basket of cases,” viewing
the expansion in part as a way to “help incubate firms and practice
groups.”161
Financing firms directly and receiving the return on the investment—often contingent on successful resolution of cases—from fees
derived from a portfolio of cases is, economically speaking, just a
hair’s breadth away from nonlawyer ownership of contingency
firms whose main assets are their future fees (and that traditionally use bank loans as a main form of finance beyond the partners’
own resources). The main asset and source of revenue streams of a
contingency fee firm is the fees generated by successful cases.
Therefore, the value of a contingency fee firm is derived, economically speaking, largely from the value of its portfolio of cases. (This
excludes additional but much more minor assets firms might own
such as equipment and software.) And, in turn, owning a right directly in the revenues from its portfolio of cases is similar to owning
a share of the firm whose majority of value is derived from the
expected future revenues of that same portfolio of cases. These practices are only slightly different from investing in law firms as an
entity. And while the similarity to nonlawyer ownership is closest
in the case of contingency firms, the case is similar, if a bit less pronounced, when third-party funders are providing funding to portfolios of cases or other forms of financing to law firms that have
other business models.
Law firm finance also implicates other relevant rules of legal
ethics. It is hard to see how the practice is something other than feesharing (more on that below). Financiers’ active management of
cases they invest in is arguably very close to, if not in fact, the

159. See Crystal, supra note 158, at 12-13.
160. See id.; Press Release, Omni Bridgeway, supra note 4.
161. See Press Release, Omni Bridgeway, supra note 4.
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practice of law by nonlawyers.162 And the support that financiers
provide, as described above, for matters such as firm and practice
incubation and recruiting is an awful lot like participation in
management.
Critically, these investment arrangements, or ownership substitutes, create the same type of concerns that would arise from
direct ownership, namely, conflicts of interests, prioritization of
profit-maximization, possible short-termism, and other associated
concerns surveyed in Part II.
C. New York and the Disclosure-Focused Paradigm
Although its recommendations are not binding, the NYCBA is an
influential organization, so it is instructive to note that it recently
and reluctantly came out in favor of liberalizing Rule 5.4. The first
act in this mini-drama came in July of 2018, when the NYCBA
issued a Formal Ethics Opinion, according to which
a lawyer [who] enter[s] into a financing agreement with a litigation funder, a non-lawyer, under which the lawyer’s future
payments to the litigation funder are contingent on the lawyer’s
receipt of legal fees or on the amount of legal fees received in one
or more specific matters.... violates Rule 5.4’s prohibition on fee
sharing with non-lawyers.163

But given how widespread portfolio financing had become, backlash from the legal profession164 compelled the NYCBA to form a
working group to revisit the question. The working group did not
dispute the conclusion of law reached in the original Formal Ethics
162. See CHILMARK PARTNERS, supra note 119; see also Funding Criteria, HARBOUR LITIG.
FUNDING, https://www.harbourlitigationfunding.com/working-with-us/what-we-look-for/
[https://perma.cc/3DJS-4UDX]. For an example of the extensive monitoring which litigation
financiers engage in with regards to their funded cases, see Press Release, Omni Bridgeway,
Covenant Holders v AET (Seas SAPFOR Litigation) (June 1, 2017), https://omnibridgeway.
com/insights/press-releases/all-press-releases/press-release/2017/06/01/covenantholders-v-aetseas-sapfor-litigation [https://perma.cc/5GJ4-GHR8].
163. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 2018-5, at 1
(2018).
164. See Paul B. Haskel & James Q. Walker, New York City Bar Opinion Stuns the Litigation Finance Markets, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=eed0a03b-ae12-4157-917f-00bdad2b2dfc [https://perma.cc/C7VU-PFPT].
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Opinion, but it did conclude that “lawyers and the clients they serve
would benefit if lawyers have less restricted access to funding.”165
However, the working group was unable to reach a consensus on
what such liberalization should look like, perhaps due to the controversial nature and implications of the emerging practice—especially considering the strongly held divergent views of various
stakeholders, including different factions of the bar.166 Instead, the
report offered two alternative proposals without endorsing either.167
Compared to Arizona’s approach, both proposals offer a light
touch as far as regulating the practice is concerned. Both nod in the
direction of lawyers’ independent judgment, duty to avoid conflicts,
and duty to maintain confidences. Beyond that, both proposals are,
in essence, disclosure regimes. One proposal is that lawyers be
allowed to receive investments as long as they obtain informed
consent from clients. The other requires disclosure only, without
consent.168

165. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at 2.
166. See id. at 90.
167. Id. at 24.
168. Proposal A proposes the following:
[A] lawyer or a law firm may share legal fees with an entity in exchange for the
entity’s providing financial assistance to the lawyer specifically for the use with
respect to a legal representation of one or more clients, provided that:
(i) the entity and its representatives do not participate, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making regarding the representation;
(ii) the lawyer or law firm maintains professional independence;
(iii) the client provides written informed consent to the financial arrangement; and
(iv) the lawyer or law firm complies will all other applicable Rules, including Rule 1.6 [on confidentiality] and Rule 1.7 [on conflicts of interest].
Id.
Proposal B proposes the following:
[A] lawyer or law firm may share legal fees with an entity in exchange for the
entity’s providing financing for the lawyer’s or law firm’s practice provided that:
(i) the lawyer and law firm do not permit the entity to participate directly or
indirectly in a matter except for the benefit of the client;
(ii) the lawyer and law firm do not disclose confidential client information except as Rule 1.6 may permit;
(iii) the lawyer and law firm comply with Rule 1.7; and
(iv) the lawyer or law firm informs the client in writing that they are sharing
or may share fees with an entity in exchange for the entity’s providing financing
for the lawyer’s or law firm’s practice.
Id. at 29.
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Much has been written about the inadequacy of disclosure
regimes, including a vast body of empirical work, concluding that
disclosure is “the most common and least successful regulatory
technique in American law.”169 In a masterful book on the topic,
Ben-Shahar and Schnieder explain how and why mandated disclosure “is a Lorelei, luring lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory
failure.”170 Mandated disclosure, they explain, aims to “address[ ]
the problem of a world in which nonspecialists must make choices
requiring specialist knowledge.”171 Disclosure is appealing because
it reflects fundamental American beliefs in free markets and autonomy; it seems to regulate with a light touch; it is relatively easy
to enact; its failures are hard to detect; and “even if it does little
evident good, it does little obvious harm.”172
In a nutshell, disclosure fails because it is impossible to convey
complexity simply.173 Even assuming consumers want, as part of
their decision-making process, to assemble relevant data, identify
outcomes, and articulate their own preferences, they would still
need to understand the disclosures. But, while even experts struggle
with such tasks, “[i]n truth, many people cannot read most disclosures. Over forty million adults are functionally illiterate; another
fifty million are only marginally literate.... Innumeracy is worse.”174
This is before we address overload—the amount of disclosures
consumers are presumed to be reading, both in terms of any given
piece of disclosure as well as in the aggregate.
In reality, rather than protect consumers, disclosure in fact
shields the discloser from tort liability, antifraud statutes, and other
causes of action. By extension, most law firm clients will neither
read, understand, nor have the bargaining power to negotiate fine
print about their law firm’s sources of capital. A cynic might say
that this is a feature, not a bug, of the proposed regulation and a
sign of what is to come if and when lawyers and financiers are left
to self-police their conflicts.
169. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014).
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 5-6.
173. Id. at 8.
174. Id.
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Further, a client’s knowledge of or consent to the firm’s receipt of
external financing has no bearing on shareholders’ rights; clients
have no power to consent on behalf of the shareholders in the
company providing the financing, to a suspension of the shareholder
primacy rule. Hence, the head-on collision between client and court
primacy and shareholder primacy would be as unresolved under the
proposed New York approach as it is under Arizona’s new regime.
D. Other States: A Movement to Reexamine Nonlawyer
Participation
Arizona and New York are not alone in revisiting the question of
whether and how to amend Rule 5.4. The District of Columbia has
long allowed ownership and fee sharing by nonlawyers in limited
circumstances.175
In 2015, Washington State became the first state to allow fee
sharing and joint ownership of a law practice between a lawyer and
nonlawyer in a narrow context: “The Supreme Court of Washington
has approved revisions to the Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers in that state that allow lawyers and limited license
legal technicians to form partnerships and share fees.”176
Similarly, in August 2020, Utah’s Supreme Court piloted a twoyear program allowing nonlawyers to offer legal services.177 The
pilot has been described by Utah’s Supreme Court as “allowing
innovation-focused legal entities to push new products in a ‘regulatory sandbox,’” with a view towards amending Utah’s “rules of
professional conduct to loosen the ethical restrictions on lawyers
with regard to ... fee-sharing.”178
175. Victoria Shannon, The Funder as Co-Counsel: A Glimpse into the Future of Law Firm
Ownership, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/ thefunder-as-co-counsel-a-glimpse-into-the-future-of-law-firm-ownership [https://perma.cc/ 84J8DDZS].
176. Robert Ambrogi, Washington OKs Fee Sharing and Joint Ownership Between Lawyers
and LLLTs, LAWSITES (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2015/04/washington-oksfee-sharing-and-joint-ownership-between-lawyers-and-lllts.html [https://perma.cc/64YM77R3].
177. Utah Sup. Ct. Standing Ord. No. 15 (2020).
178. Dan Packel & Dylan Jackson, The Fight over the Future of Law Firm Ownership Has
Put an Industry at Odds, N.J. L.J. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
X8CUQ6CC000000?jcsearch=hdi45ifiem#jcite [https://perma.cc/64X5-PYYU].
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In California, a proposed amendment to the Rule that “would expand the existing exception for fee-sharing arrangements with a
nonprofit organization ... provided that the nonprofit organization
qualifies under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code” is
pending for public comment.179
And in Illinois, the Chicago Bar Association launched a task force
to explore a reform of the Rule.180
This is what a movement looks like.
E. Arizona’s Revolution and the Ethics Paradigm
Commencing January 2021, Arizona is leading the way with the
farthest-reaching reform to the practice of law of any state in the
nation. The reform consists of two main prongs. One is the introduction of a licensure track that will allow nonlawyers, “Legal
Paraprofessionals” (LPs), to provide legal services—including
representation in court—on a limited basis.181 The second is replacing Arizona’s version of Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits nonlawyers from sharing in lawyers’ fees, holding an economic interest
in a law firm, or participating in the management of a law firm,
with a regime regulating nonlawyer participation.182 Of the two
changes, the second is of most interest to us here.
Under the new regime, firms can now include “Authorized Person[s],” defined as anyone who “possess[es] ... [a]n economic interest
in the [ABS] equal to or more than 10 percent of all economic
interests ... or ... [t]he legal right to exercise decision-making
authority on behalf of the [ABS].”183 Decision-making authority can
be direct or indirect and can come in the form of “[c]ontrol or

179. STATE BAR OF CAL., PROPOSED AMENDED CALIFORNIA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
5.4 (2020), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Our-Mission/Protecting-the-Public/PublicComment/Public-Comment-Archives/2020-Public-Comment/Proposed-Amended-CaliforniaRule-of-Professional-Conduct-54-Financial-and-Similar-Arrangements-with-Nonlawyers
[https://perma.cc/7UEA-YUCK].
180. Packel & Jackson, supra note 178.
181. News Release, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., supra note 7.
182. Id.
183. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Ord. No. 2020-173 § A (2020) [hereinafter Order 173], https://
www.azcourts.gov/Portals/22/admorder/Orders20/2020-173F.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XDRJPUS].
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participat[ion] in the management or affairs of the ABS,” by operation of law or contract.184
At the most abstract level, the regulatory regime can be said to be
comprised of five elements. First, before accepting investments from
Economic Interest Holders, or granting them management authority, a firm must be structured as an ABS—subjecting it to extensive
licensing requirements. Second, the core legal ethics rules (such as
conflicts of interest, duty of confidentiality) extend to the ABS (as an
entity) as well as its Authorized Persons, including nonlawyers.
Third, the new rules impose various obligations on ABSs and turn
lawyers in an ABS into ‘gatekeepers’ responsible for the ABS’s and
its Authorized Persons’ compliance.185 Fourth, the amendments to
the rules clarify that lawyers’ entire set of professional and ethical
responsibilities remain applicable even when a lawyer is practicing
as part of an ABS—even when taking on a nonlawyer as an investor
and, by implication, becoming their fiduciaries.186 Fifth, critically,
the licensing and regulation of ABSs is the province of the Arizona
Supreme Court, making the Arizona Supreme Court the regulator
of ABSs, Economic Interest Holders, and lawyers.187 So, a Singaporean who is passively investing in an Arizona law firm would
be regulated by the Arizona Supreme Court. Notably, the stricter of
the two New York Task Force’s proposals188 is baked into the
Arizona rules which, even prior to the reform, defined “unprofessional conduct” as “accept[ing] compensation for representing a
client from anyone other than the client without the client’s
knowledge and approval.”189
The following paragraphs explain these five elements in greater
detail, and the following Section compares and contrasts this regulatory regime to the one built into benefit entities.

184. Id. (emphasis added). I will generally use the term Authorized Persons, except when
referring to passive investors, in which case I will use the term Economic Interest Holders.
185. Id. § 6(3)(b).
186. Id. § K.
187. Id. § D.
188. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
189. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Ord. No. R-20-0034, at 56 (2020) [hereinafter Order Amending Rules],
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/215/ABS%20Documents/Final%20Order_R-20-0034.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2NV7-Z8HJ].
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1. Alternative Business Structures and Licensure
An ABS is “a business entity that includes nonlawyers who have
an economic interest or decision-making authority in the firm and
provides legal services in accord with [Arizona] Supreme Court
Rules.”190 In order to be engaged in the authorized practice of law,
such an entity must be licensed and must include at least one
lawyer who is an active member in good standing of the State Bar
of Arizona and who supervises the practice of law conducted by the
ABS.191 “Any lawyer who provides legal services through an unlicensed ABS is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.”192
The new rules establish a Committee on Alternative Business
Structures (the Committee) which, inter alia, administers the licensing.193 The existence of Authorized Persons must be disclosed
and any failure to do so is both independent ground for sanction as
well as an aggravating circumstance of other violations.194 And
Authorized Persons’ conflicts of interest and affiliations (for example, parents and subsidiaries) must also be disclosed.195 Perhaps
anticipating a temptation to circumvent the disclosure requirement,
as well as understanding the potential conflict created by a
triangular relationship between lawyers, their clients, and their
investors, the Supreme Court of Arizona made the first grounds for
denial or revocation of a license the commission of “material misrepresentation, omission, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in the
application form” on the part of an applicant or any Authorized
Persons.196
When recommending to the Arizona Supreme Court whether to
grant a license, the Committee must place the public interest first,
including “(A) protecting and promoting the public interest;
(B) promoting access to legal services; (C) advancing the administration of justice and the rule of law; (D) encouraging an independent,
strong, diverse, and effective legal profession; and (E) promoting
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Order 173, supra note 183, § A.
Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 9-10, 51.
Id. at 42.
Order 173, supra note 183, § D(5).
Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 67.
Order 173, supra note 183, § G(1)(b)-(c).
Id. § E(2)(d).
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and maintaining adherence to professional principles.”197 The
Committee must also consider the governance structure of the entity
seeking a license and whether it ensures that the core tenets of legal
ethics will be upheld.198
2. Extension of Core Ethics Requirements to ABSs and
Nonlawyers
The new rules regard all of the newly authorized forms of nonlawyer participation as “the practice of law.” Therefore, the amended rules extend core elements of the code of legal ethics to both
ABSs and to Authorized Persons. First, as noted, as a prerequisite
for licensure as an ABS, the Committee must satisfy itself that the
applicant has adequate governance structures and policies in place
to ensure that the “lawyers providing legal services to consumers act
with independence consistent with the lawyers’ professional responsibilities.”199 This can be regarded as a catchall provision that
incorporates by reference all of lawyers’ ethical obligations. An
applicant for ABS status must also convince the Committee, specifically, that confidentiality will be maintained.200 And, in another
catchall, the applicant must also demonstrate that “lawyers’ duties
and responsibilities to clients” will take precedence over “any other
business policies or procedures.”201
In addition, the Committee must satisfy itself that the applicant’s
governance structures allow a “lawyer [to] make[ ] decisions in the
best interest of clients.”202 This can also be seen as a type of stakeholder governance requirement.
Each ABS and its Authorized Persons must adhere to the Rules
of the Arizona Supreme Court and to a code of conduct.203 The “minimum standards of conduct” enumerated in the code do “not allow
the legal representation of clients, if the representation involves a
conflict of interest;” prohibit taking “any action or engag[ing] in
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. § E(2)(a)(1).
Id. § E(2)(a)(2).
Id. § E(2)(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § E(2)(a)(2)(D).
Id. § E(2)(a)(2)(E).
Id. § E(2)(a)(2)(C).
Id. §§ G(2)(a), K(1)-(2).
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activity that interferes with the professional independence of lawyers;” prohibit “tak[ing] an action or engag[ing] in any activity that
misleads or attempts to mislead a client, a court, or others;” requires
maintenance of “effective governance structures, arrangements,
systems, and controls to ensure ... [c]ompliance with the requirements of supreme court rules” and the code of conduct; and requires
ensuring that “[m]anagers, economic interest holders, decisionmakers ... do not cause or substantially contribute to a breach of the
[Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct].”204 Grounds for disciplining
members of the bar as well as affiliate members, nonmembers, and
ABSs include violations of professional conduct rules in any jurisdiction; violation of a canon of judicial conduct; and the knowing
violation of any rule or any order of the court.205
3. Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities Are Not Superseded by
Fiduciary Duties to Investors
A main effect of the reform is that in Arizona, lawyers will now
have a pair of otherwise-equal fiduciary duties: one to their clients—
by virtue of the ethics rules—and the other to their investors—by
virtue of the general principles of business law.206 This is in addition
to likely never-before-seen attractions such as active investors who
can, and likely will, invest in multiple firms, including ones that
may be on adverse sides of a case, or on different sides of the same
transaction, and lawyers working for/owning firm A&B LLP who
also invest in law firm X&Y LLP. By clarifying that “[m]embers of
an ABS who are members of the state bar bear the responsibility of
the ethical and professional obligations of the profession as well as
the standards stated herein,”207 the amended regulations resolve
any conflict in favor of the client.
In fact, throughout the regulations, the principle of lawyers’ independent judgment is enshrined as paramount. The involvement
of the Authorized Persons and their interests is subordinated to the

204. Id. § K(1).
205. Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 56, 74.
206. See generally HOLGER SPAMANN, CORPORATIONS § 2 (2017), https://opencasebook.org/
casebooks/261-corporations/sections/2-the-basics/ [https://perma.cc/U39A-GDBD].
207. Order 173, supra note 183, § K.
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best interests of the clients. And the lawyers are charged with ensuring that the foregoing is indeed the case:
A lawyer in a firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that
the conduct of nonlawyers engaged in activities assisting lawyers in providing legal services and those who have access to
attorney-client information, is compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer. Reasonable measures include, but are
not limited to, adopting and enforcing policies and procedures
designed ... to prevent nonlawyers in a firm from directing,
controlling, or materially limiting the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment on behalf of clients or materially influencing which clients a lawyer does or does not represent.208

However, nowhere is the head-on collision with shareholder
primacy acknowledged and, perhaps consequently, the primacy of
the clients and courts as stakeholders is not made explicit anywhere
in the new rules or their commentary.
4. Lawyers as Gatekeepers
The new rules mandate that all ABSs must designate a “[c]ompliance lawyer” who must be “an active member of the State Bar of
Arizona ... [and who] is responsible for ensuring compliance with the
rules governing ABSs” and Arizona’s legal ethics rules.209 The
compliance lawyer is an enforcer (and even a snitch) or, to apply a
theoretical term, a gatekeeper. In the corporate governance literature, gatekeepers are defined as “independent professional[s] ...
positioned so as to be able to prevent wrongdoing by withholding
necessary cooperation or consent.... [T]hey are repeat players who
provide certification or verification services to [stakeholders] vouching for someone else who has a greater incentive than they to
deceive.”210 Otherwise stated, gatekeepers are agents “who act[ ] as

208. Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 41.
209. Order 173, supra note 183, §§ A, G(3).
210. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
2 (2006).
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a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of
the ‘signal’ sent by,” in our case, the ABS.211
Among other things, the compliance lawyer must be sufficiently
qualified to “ensure that ethical obligations, protection of the public,
and standards of professionalism are adhered to,”212 and she must
take reasonable steps to ensure that Authorized Persons and others
“associated with” the ABS “do not cause or substantially contribute
to a breach of the regulatory requirements of this code or the ethical and professional obligations of lawyers.”213 Here, again, we see
a wholesale incorporation by reference of the code of legal ethics.
The gatekeepers must notify the state bar of breaches and of facts
which may constitute a breach.214 Furthermore, the gatekeepers are
responsible for ensuring the ABS’s and its employees’ adherence to
the regime’s disclosure requirements (including conflicts) and
ensuring that adequate governance structures and policies are in
place to maintain lawyers’ independence, work standards, confidentiality, and other duties to the client.215
Interestingly, it is not only the ABS that is responsible, both directly and through the employ of the compliance lawyer, to monitor
compliance by Authorized Persons and others. The converse is also
true: “An authorized person, including any manager, economic interest holder, or decision-maker in an ABS is individually responsible for compliance by the ABS with this code of conduct.”216 One can
think of this as an agents-watching-agents way to address the
structural conflicts that nonlawyer participation introduces, as well
as any temptation to violate ethical requirements.217

211. Id.
212. Order 173, supra note 183, § G(3)(a)(5).
213. Id. § G(3)(b)(3) (emphasis added).
214. This “duty to report ... appl[ies] to lawyers who work in or have ownership interests
in an ABS.” Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 49 (emphasis added).
215. Order 173, supra note 183, §§ E(2)(a)(2), G(3)(b).
216. Id. § K(2).
217. Steinitz, supra note 152, at 1325 n.200 (“Developed in the context of institutional
shareholders’ monitoring corporate managers, the concept of ‘agents watching agents’ involves situations where the self-interests of one set of agents involves monitoring other
agents, who have a different set of self-interests which, in turn, may conflict with the interests
of the principals.” (quoting Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 850 (1992))).
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5. The Arizona Supreme Court as Regulator—A Storm on the
Horizon?
As is true in most states, the practice of law in Arizona is regulated by the state supreme court218 and its subsidiary, the state
bar.219 This oversight function is, of course, distinct from the court’s
adjudicatory function. As an adjudicator, the court can, of course,
interpret and apply the law, considering the legislature’s acts, precedent, and the state constitution. Without digressing into a discussion of the judicial function and the limits of judicial review, on
occasion that interpretation amounts to significant change. It is
important to make these elementary observations because it is not
at all clear that the court can effect the same magnitude of change
in the law in its role as an overseer, by interpreting the concept of
“the practice of law” so broadly that it encapsulates investments (including passive ones) in law firms.220 Certainly, it can update the
rules governing the legal profession, abolish Rule 5.4, and permit
nonlawyers to participate in the business of providing legal services.
But, given the separation of powers between court and legislature,
it seems a stretch to argue that, in so doing, it can change the business law that governs corporations and which favors shareholder
primacy.
That the practice of law is under the authority of states’ supreme
courts is a well-settled matter in the United States. The Arizona
State Constitution, for instance, states that “[t]he judicial power
shall be vested in an integrated judicial department.”221 This has
been interpreted in the leading early cases as meaning that “the
practice of law [falls] exclusively within the authority of the
Judiciary.”222 The court has defined the practice of law as “those
acts, whether performed in court or in the law office, which lawyers

218. Order 173, supra note 183, § D(1) (“The supreme court is authorized to regulate the
practice of law as a function of its responsibility to administer an integrated judiciary.”).
219. Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 51.
220. Order 173, supra note 183, § K (extending the Supreme Court of Arizona’s regulatory
function to Authorized Persons and LPs); Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 9, 67, 88
(jurisdiction).
221. ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
222. In re Creasy, 12 P.3d 214, 216 (Ariz. 2000) (quoting In re Smith, 939 P.2d 422, 424
(Ariz. 1997)).
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customarily have carried on from day to day through the centuries.”223 Beyond this doctrinal definition, the Arizona Rules of the
Supreme Court further define the practice of law and provide a nonexhaustive list of conduct that is considered the practice of law.224
None of the enumerated activities, it should be noted, appear to
cover investment in a law firm nor its management.225 And Arizona’s ABS regime extends the rules governing complaints, investigations, and disciplinary proceedings to Authorized Persons, ABSs,
and their members.226 Disciplinary measures are to be meted by a
judge (not the bar association).227 The sanctions available, in addition to suspension or revocation of an ABS’s license,228 span the
entire gamut of the court’s authority—for example, injunctions, civil
contempt, civil penalties, costs and expenses—and go beyond the
sanctions that a bar association may ordinarily impose.229
However, the new reality of nonlawyer participation and, especially, investing, including passively, in law firms stretches the
system beyond what was likely originally envisioned when the
constitutional order was put in place. This becomes clearest when
considering the case of a passive investor. Let us consider the
hypothetical of a Singaporean investor who passively invests in both
an Arizona law firm and a chain of dry cleaners. This investor from
a world away will now have one of her investments regulated by the
Arizona Supreme Court as overseer, the other by the legislature
(and the Arizona Supreme Court as adjudicator). One investment
will conform to her usual expectations about the law governing the
conduct of a business entity—that is, it will work to maximize
return on her investment. The other will not. The directors and
officers of the dry-cleaning chain will have the duties and obligations set by statute and decades of court holdings, while those of the
ABS will have the duties and obligations set by the court. It is not

223.
1961)).
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 217 (quoting State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Tr. Co., 366 P.2d 1, 14 (Ariz.
ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 31.
Id.
Order 173, supra note 183, § H(1)-(2); Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 73.
Order 173, supra note 183, § H(1)-(2); Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 73.
Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 18-19.
Order 173, supra note 183, § H(2).
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clear that the power granted to the court by the Arizona Constitution encompasses such far-reaching results.
Critically, this investor is now subject to two irreconcilable
bodies of law: Arizona’s business law, which is premised on shareholder primacy,230 and Arizona’s legal ethics, which are premised on
stakeholder primacy.231 In addition, the investor is generally governed by business law and its shareholder primacy principle—the
obligation to maximize his own shareholders’ profits.
The solution may be simple: that the general rules of construction
apply and lex specialis derogat legi generali.232 Namely, the more
specific rules will prevail over more general rules if one accepts that
business law is legi generali and the regulation of the practice of law
is lex specialis. However, considering the ABS regime as lex specialis
presupposes that the court has the power to alter business law
through its oversight function. That is a proposition which, at the
least, is contestable and will no doubt be contested. In addition to
questions about business law and the regulation of the professions,
it implicates the separation of powers between the judiciary and the
legislature. In order to avoid constitutional controversy, the Arizona
legislature should ratify the court’s reform and require the usage of
benefit entities—as should any state that wants to follow suit.
6. The Path to Change: The Institutional Angle
It may not have escaped the reader that past attempted reforms
in the United States have been conducted entirely by and through
the bar associations. In the United Kingdom and Australia, conversely, the commissions tasked with making recommendations as
to whether, and if so how, to liberalize the legal services sector have
not been monopolized by the profession itself.233 While lawyers were

230. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277-78
(1998).
231. See supra Part I.
232. Lex specialis derogat legi generali, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
233. Jay C. Carlisle, English White Paper Law Reforms: An Outline for Equal Access to
Justice?, 62 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 54, 56 (1990); MJ Quinn, Note, Reform of the Legal Profession in
England and Wales, 12 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 261, 285-86 (1991).

2022]

THE PARTNERSHIP MYSTIQUE

993

represented, the commissions included nonlawyer representatives
as well.234
In Arizona, something similar may explain why the state managed to break away from the nationwide impasse. Under Arizona’s
constitution, it is Arizona’s Supreme Court that “is authorized to
regulate the practice of law as a function of its responsibility to
administer an integrated judiciary.”235 The reform was enacted
neither by way of bar association task force reports and changes to
the state’s rules of professional responsibility nor by way of state
legislation.236 Rather, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered the creation of a Task Force under its own auspices. The Task Force was
chaired by the Vice Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court and
comprised partly of lawyers practicing in law firms, but mostly of
representatives of the judiciary, the private sector, and academia.237
The task force issued a report that was adopted by a (unanimous)
vote of the Arizona Supreme Court and enacted into law by way of
administrative orders.238 These administrative orders amended the
Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court,239 the Arizona Rules of Evidence,240 and the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration.241 While
justices are jurists, and therefore socialized much like the members
of the bar, they are first and foremost members of the bench.
Entrusted with the administration of justice and possessing a systemwide view of impediments thereto, one can surmise that their
primary fealty is to the justice system rather than the profession’s
ability to maximize profits.

234. Carlisle, supra note 233, at 56-57; Past Commissioners, AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM’N,
https://www.alrc.gov.au/about/commissioners/past-commissioners/ [https://perma.cc/7GD7KW7W].
235. Order 173, supra note 183, § D(1).
236. The reform was studied and recommended by the Arizona Supreme Court’s Task Force
on the Delivery of Legal Services, chaired by the Vice Chief Justice. See News Release, Ariz.
Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., supra note 7.
237. Member List of the Task Force on Delivery of Legal Services, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH (Jan.
10, 2019), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/LSTF/MemberList011019LSTF.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6GVZ-DW54].
238. Legal Services Reforms, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.azcourts.gov/accesstolegal
services [https://perma.cc/RN2S-J6RG].
239. Order Amending Rules, supra note 189, at 2.
240. Id.
241. Order 173, supra note 183.
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This path is worth considering because it is both critical for understanding “why Arizona?” and for pondering whether other states
are likely to follow. It also bolsters the following observation. The
upshot of Arizona’s path to the reform (as well as that of the United
Kingdom and Australia), is that process matters and may have been
outcome-determinative in achieving a reform that has eluded the
rest of the country for a century. If one would like to see similar
changes in other states, going through the legislatures and/or
committees in which lawyers are represented but are not in control
of the process is likely a necessary-though-insufficient factor in any
similar reform.
IV. LAW FIRMS AS BENEFIT ENTITIES: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The lawyers’ hierarchy of duties was always the court, number
one, and the client, number two. A duty to shareholders’ need for
revenue, profits and dividends, inevitably would create incompatibility.242

This Part offers the normative argument that investment in law
firms should be allowed as long as it is conditioned on governance
requirements that place the courts and the clients decisively ahead
of shareholders. It further suggests that benefit entities provide a
ready-made legal technology to do so, consistent with the relevant
state’s existing corporate law.
The challenges that participation of nonlawyers, as owners and
managers, presents to the practice of law are real and must be
addressed. However, they are not dissimilar to what other professions face and the benefits to the public and to many (albeit perhaps
not all) members of the profession are considerable. Liberalization
is likely to lead to increased access to justice and, perhaps counterintuitively, could enhance the dignity and diversity of the profession and the welfare of the practitioners. In that light, a blanket
prohibition barring all nonlawyer participation seems an overly
blunt tool to deal with the risks. Especially considering that independent judgment and client focus are, in the abstract and all
other things being equal, logically unrelated to the organizational
242. Ackland, supra note 149.
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form of the business entity in which the practice of law occurs.
Moreover, the floodgates have already opened. Nonlawyer participation, and even functional equivalents of ownership, with attendant
indirect management of law firms are already upon us. The only
question that remains is how best to regulate them.
Fortunately, neither the Arizona Supreme Court nor other courts
and legislatures liberalizing Rule 5.4 need to look far for a legal
model that definitively supplants shareholder primacy in favor of
stakeholder primacy: the benefit entity (including benefit corporations and benefit LLCs). This Part concludes with a proposal that
nonlawyer participation, as Economic Interest Holders and/or
managers, should be permitted on the condition that firms seeking
this route organize as legal benefit entities (LBEs), laying out the
details of the proposal and explaining how such organizations will
help reduce the risk that introducing nonlawyers may raise.
A. In Defense of Nonlawyer Participation
While the prevailing majority’s reasons for restricting the participation of nonlawyers in the legal profession have not changed
much in the past century, academic debates have furnished ever
more sophisticated and trenchant critiques of the status quo. The
ABA recently described the four main arguments in favor of allowing Alternative Business Structures involving nonlawyer ownership
as increased access to justice, enhanced financial flexibility, greater
operational flexibility, and increased cost-effectiveness and quality
of services.243 These, and others, are explored below.
The following Subsection argues that LBEs will maintain client
trust by continuing to regulate individual attorneys and by subjecting the business entity to a legally enforceable requirement that
it operate for the benefit of its clients. LBEs will reduce inefficiencies and thereby, arguably, increase access to justice by creating
competition, permitting and encouraging economies of scale, and
driving down costs. LBEs will also improve the dignity of the
profession and welfare of practitioners by removing many of the

243. ABA ISSUES PAPER, supra note 60, at 7-9.
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obstacles to diversity and providing an alternative to the billable
hour, the primary driver of dissatisfaction.
1. Independent Judgment and Client Focus Are Unrelated to
Current Organizational Forms
Without the shareholder primacy doctrine’s prohibition of decisions not aimed at maximizing profit, attorneys’ ability to exercise
independent judgment, zealously represent the interest of the client,
and maintain client confidentiality bear no conceptual or logical
relationship to the corporate form of the entity in which lawyers
practice. Proponents of reform have long made that argument in
theory, and that theory is now supported by several years of empirical data from jurisdictions that allow nonlawyer participation.244
Reformers have, over the decades, pointed out several errors in
the reasoning of those who maintain that practicing with, or reporting to, nonlawyers would compromise lawyers’ ability to adhere
to their ethical obligations (assuming, absent shareholder primacy,
that such adherence would not place the lawyer or her superiors in
legal jeopardy). The report of the Kutak Commission, for instance,
argued that the link between the form of practice and professional
judgment is “at best tenuous” and might amount to economic protectionism, noting also that even then there were enough exceptions
to the general rule to raise questions about its equitable application
and pointing out that strict adherence to the law impeded innovation.245 One commentator noted that the idea that there is a strong
relationship between exercising independent judgment, avoiding
conflicts, and maintaining loyalty, on the one hand, and organizational form, on the other, rests on faulty assumptions, including
that “attorney-employees are not independent or capable of independence” and that “profit motive by definition subverts ethical
behavior.”246

244. ABA ISSUES PAPER, supra note 60, at 4-7.
245. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF PRO. STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT:
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 176-78 (1981).
246. Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 MO. L. REV. 151, 178-179 (2000).
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The existence and universal acceptance of both in-house counsel
and of lawyers paid by insurance companies to represent the insured give the lie to the first assumption.247 We also readily accept
conflicts that might undermine an outside attorney’s independence,
as in the case of an insurance defense attorney who gets a substantial amount of work from the same insurer.248 As to the question of
profit motive, it beggars the imagination of anyone familiar with
modern law practice to contend that lawyers are immune from the
profit motive simply because they are organized into an LLP or
LLC.249 It is arguable whether lawyers as a profession were ever
unconcerned with maximizing their incomes.250 But if they were,
that attitude passed away at least a generation ago, felled by the
American Lawyer’s publication of the Profits-Per-Partner (PPP)
matrix, the rise of limited liability law practices (LLPs and LLCs)
which facilitated the growth in size of law firms, globalization, and
the increased lateral mobility of partners.251 Furthermore, lawyers
pursuing profit presents no greater challenge than tensions between
ethics and profit that exist in other professions rooted in trust and
the public good. Many such professions have successfully transitioned away from the individual practice model. Medicine, for instance, relies on ethical rules and other forms of liability to deter
and remediate conflicts of interests and breaches of duties.252
247. See In re Coop. L. Co., 92 N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 917
S.W.2d 568, 572-73 (Ky. 1996).
248. Giesel, supra note 246, at 181.
249. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American
Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 142-43 (2000); Andrews, supra note 32, at 602;
Carole Silver, Nicole De Bruin Phelan & Mikaela Rabinowitz, Between Diffusion and Distinctiveness in Globalization: U.S. Law Firms Go Global, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1441-44
(2009).
250. Giesel, supra note 246, at 158.
251. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 52-53 (1991); Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The
Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867,
1879, 1896 (2008).
252. See Hadfield, supra note 60, at 59-60; MARK A. HALL & JUSTIN G. VAUGHN, HEALTH
CARE CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION §§ 3.4-3.5.2 (1993). These reforms were,
however, opposed by large sections of the medical industry when they were being implemented. See Douglas R. Wholey, Jon B. Christianson & Susan M. Sanchez, The Effect of
Physician and Corporate Interests on the Formation of Health Maintenance Organizations, 99
AM. J. SOCIO. 164, 164-65 (1993). Other professions that saw the decline of the partnership
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It is also important to point out that the one type of entity that
arguably did, on the basis of its organizational form alone, constrain
conflicts, the general partnership, has long been out of fashion. In
a general partnership, partners had no limited liability but rather
joint and several liability for each other’s decisions and therefore
had an incentive to monitor one another. The nearly universal move
to limited liability entities for law practice has eliminated the incentive and cut the tie between corporate form and ethics.
In sum, instead of linking ethics to organizational form, the
analytically correct and therefore normatively desired link is
between regulation and behavior. In every other context, constraining corporations in order to achieve social ends has focused on corporate behavior while remaining agnostic on corporate structure:
“lawyer discipline would survive law firm restructuring. The
question is whether the regulation ought to focus on lawyer behavior
or law firm structure. There is little mandatory regulation of corporate structure, yet corporate behavior itself is heavily regulated
by federal and state law.”253 Indeed, lawyers always had fiduciary
duties to co-owners—their partners—that could potentially conflict
with their fiduciary duties to their clients. Nonetheless, professional
responsibility norms and ethos bounded the degree to which lawyers
acted to an extent we found acceptable.
The experience in other countries validates this point. Summarizing several empirical studies of the effects of liberalization of the
prohibition on nonlawyer participation in Australia and the United
Kingdom, the ABA Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession in the United States noted in an informal issues paper that
“[t]here is no evidence that [nonlawyer participation] has caused
harm. There is currently no evidence that the introduction of ABS
has resulted in a deterioration of the legal profession’s ‘core

model in recent decades include investment banking, advertising, accounting, and consulting.
See Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence, 63 J. FIN. 311, 311-15 (2008); Andrew von Nordenflycht, Is
Public Ownership Bad for Professional Service Firms? Ad Agency Ownership, Performance,
and Creativity, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 429, 429-30 (2007). A few have gone a step further and
have gone public. See, e.g., MANDIS, supra note 94, at 93-97, 104-06. Many professions have
moved away from the partnership model in favor of incorporation.
253. GEO. UNIV. L. CTR., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PRO., LAW FIRMS, ETHICS, AND
EQUITY CAPITAL: A CONVERSATION 31 (2007) (comment of Professor Larry Ribstein).
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values.’”254 The Commission quoted a report from the U.K. Legal
Consumer Panel, which concluded that “the dire predictions about
a collapse in ethics and reduction in access to justice as a result of
ABS have not materialised.”255 Studies of Australia similarly support the conclusion that allowing nonlawyer participation in
providing legal services will not precipitate a collapse in the core
values of the profession.256
2. Access to Justice: Professions and the Public Good
Perhaps the most trenchant and persistent critique of the current
regime is that, in truth, it is motivated by the self-regulating bar’s
desire to protect its members from competition. This protectionism,
in turn, raises the cost of legal services such that it is, at best, more
expensive than it needs to be and, at worst, prohibitively expensive
for most members of society.257
According to the most recent edition of the Rule of Law Index,
published annually by the World Justice Project, the United States
scored 0.45 out of 1.0 on the affordability and accessibility of civil
justice, tying with Honduras and Bangladesh at 109th out of 128
countries.258 That is a precipitous drop from the 2012-2013 edition,
when its score was 0.53 out of 1.0 for a rank of 67th out of 97 (tied
with Uganda).259 Rather than pay high prices for legal services,
many are representing themselves or foregoing legal recourse
altogether. A recent study conducted by the University of Chicago

254. ABA ISSUES PAPER, supra note 60, at 12.
255. Id.; LEGAL SERVS. CONSUMER PANEL, CONSUMER IMPACT REPORT 15 (2014), http://
www.legalservicesconsumerpanel.org.uk/publications/research_and_reports/documents/Co
nsumer%20Impact%20Report%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKJ5-CXLT].
256. ABA ISSUES PAPER, supra note 60, at 5, 8, 11-12.
257. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional
Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 180, 182-83 (2014).
258. WJP Rule of Law Index: United States, WORLD JUST. PROJECT (2020), https://worldjus
ticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2020/United%20States/Civil%20Justice/
[https://perma.cc/TU5P-S3LG].
259. WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX: 2012-2013, at 175 (2013), https://worldjus
ticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_Index_Report_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3WQV-FXN3]; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227, 1227 (2014).
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on behalf of the Legal Services Corporation—the largest funder of
civil legal aid in the United States—found that low-income Americans received either inadequate or no legal assistance for 86 percent
of their civil legal problems and low-income Americans seek legal
help for only 20 percent of their civil legal problems.260 In New York
in 2013, “98% of tenants in eviction cases and 95% of parents in
child support cases were unrepresented.”261
As several commentators have observed,
The principal obstacle to increasing access to legal assistance is
the cost of the business model in which legal services have conventionally been available to ordinary consumers.... The model
foregoes the cost-reducing benefits of scale, branding, technology, and the ordinary efficiencies that would come from having
lawyers specialize in legal functions, while others (software
engineers, financial analysts, business managers, marketing
experts, and so on) specialize in all the other functions.262

That model, in turn, is maintained in part by lawyers “using their
special access to the regulatory levers to protect themselves from
competition by alternative providers and business models.”263 The
effects of protectionism and preventing nonlawyer investment in law
firms are not only to decrease competition that nonlawyers might
pose to lawyers, but also the competition that start-ups and small
firms might pose to incumbent firms. This harms the users of the
system—that is, the clients—who have to pay higher rates. For
many Americans, legal services are prohibitively expensive, rendering access to justice illusory.
A word of caution is warranted here. The emphasis in the commentary on access to justice as the main reason to favor reform

260. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
30 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJus
ticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8GK-AXUY].
261. Id. at 9; see also N.Y. STATE CTS. ACCESS TO JUST. PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE AND THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 16, 46 (2015),
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/ip/nya2j/pdfs/NYA2J_2015report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EDL5-PVMM].
262. Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to Promote
Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1193-94 (2016).
263. Id. at 1194.
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS
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notwithstanding, even though litigation funding has grown exponentially in the United States for at least fifteen years, there is no
evidence that it has increased access to justice. And there is some
evidence from Australia and the United Kingdom that “for reasons
under-explored in the literature, the access benefits of non-lawyer
ownership are generally oversold, potentially diverting attention
from more promising access strategies.”264
Proponents of reform argue that the restructuring of the legal
profession must rest on four pillars: a licensing scheme that allows
entities other than lawyer-only firms to engage in the business of
providing legal services; more permissive rules on ownership and fee
sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers; creating more classes of
legal professionals; and allowing nonlawyers to perform at least
some types of legal services.265 This Article joins those proponents,
and offers a novel, practical approach to abolishing the fee-sharing
prohibition and replacing it with a regulatory scheme based on
enforceable norms of client and court primacy.
3. Ending the Hunger Games: The Dignity of the
Profession and the Welfare of Practitioners
One of the main implications of allowing nonlawyer participation
in the business of providing legal services is the decline of the “hunger games”—the modern permutation of the venerable “Cravath
model” and the “tournament of lawyers.”266 Ultimately, this could
benefit the women and minorities who are casualties of the up-orout feature of that century-old system.267
The conditions of the practice of law, especially in mid- to largesize corporate law firms, have arguably degraded to such an extent
over the years that it is hard to argue that lawyers would be worse

264. Robinson, supra note 74, at 1.
265. Hadfield & Rhode, supra note 262, at 1215-16; Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to
Improve Access: Changing the Way Courts Regulate Legal Markets, 143 J. AM. ACAD. ARTS &
SCIS. 83, 90 (2014); see also BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND
REBIRTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 173-75, 212-14 (2015); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE
WITH LAWYERS 24-26, 40-43, 47-50 (2015); Hadfield, supra note 60, at 43-44; David B. Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 846-47 (1992).
266. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 251, at 1873, 1875-76.
267. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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off working in a more traditional corporation (or LLC). In fact, there
is evidence to suggest they would be better off. What used to be
called the “tournament of lawyers”—the seven- or eight-year competition for partnership that ended with “up or out”—has changed
drastically.268 Globalization; technological changes; the advent of
lateral partner mobility;269 reduced client loyalty; the arrival of firm
ranking and the publication of profits-per-partner metrics; the rise
of the limited liability partnership (LLP), which propelled the
exponential growth in firm size but also loosened the internal bonds
and firm cultures; the introduction of the nonequity partner and
various permanent associates tracks (for example, of-counsels);
introduction of de-equitization of partners; and the consequent
extension of the tournament into a lifelong state have all modified
the tournament.270
Instead of the “tournament of lawyers” we now have the “hunger
games.” Partnership has become ever more elusive, and, with the
introduction of de-equitization, tenure in the partnership less
secure. Meanwhile, the conditions for participating in the tournament—the demands placed on law firm associates—have become
increasingly oppressive. This has resulted in ever-increasing
demands for billable hours; ever-decreasing chances of “winning”
the tournament; highly interpersonally competitive workplaces;
decreasing diversity; and astronomical levels of job dissatisfaction.271
A recent study of nearly thirteen thousand lawyers in the United
States found that “[l]evels of depression, anxiety, and stress among
attorneys ... are significant, with 28%, 19%, and 23% experiencing
mild or higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress, respectively.
In terms of career prevalence, 61% reported concerns with anxiety
at some point in their career and 46% reported concerns with
268. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 251, at 1873, 1875-76.
269. That was brought about by the collection and dissemination of the profits-per-partner
data by The American Lawyer magazine. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 251, at 71, 104.
270. On all of these factors, see generally Galanter & Henderson, supra note 251, at 1871,
1875-76, 1898; RIBSTEIN, supra note 124, at 127-28; RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 3, 10-14 (2013).
271. The billable hour in and of itself is the cause of much misery. See, e.g., Susan Saab
Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and
the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 245, 251 n.70 (2000);
William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151, 151-52 (1987).
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depression.”272 These levels were much higher than the general
population.273 As one commentator put it, “[a]s law firms work to
maximize profits and cut costs, partners and associates complain of
low morale and poor quality of life.”274 This is true of both associates
and partners.
Law firms are not only particularly unhappy places to work, they
are also among the least diverse, a situation that has worsened in
the wake of successive economic crises.275 This is so, despite decades
of diversity efforts and initiatives.276 Research suggests this is structural; a number of authors have pinpointed certain aspects of the
Cravath model or tournament of lawyers system as contributing to
the lack of diversity and opportunities for diverse attorneys in law
firms.277 A new 2019 ABA report documents a “stampede” of women
out of the profession.278 While more than 50 percent of law students
nationally are women, by age fifty, women make up only 27 percent
of the profession.279 And while 45-50 percent of entering associates
are women it remains the case, as it has for decades, that only 20
percent of partners and only 16 percent of equity partners are
272. Patrick R. Krill, Ryan Johnson & Linda Albert, The Prevalence of Substance Use and
Other Mental Health Concerns Among American Attorneys, 10 J. ADDICTION MED. 46, 51
(2016). Additional data, which paints a complex picture of lawyer satisfaction, is available
through the American Bar Foundation’s “After the JD” project. See After the JD, AM. BAR
FOUND., http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/project/118 [https://perma.cc/34BR24RB].
273. Krill et al., supra note 272, at 52.
274. Molot, supra note 78, at 3; see also Fortney, supra note 271, at 271-72.
275. Deborah L. Rhode, Law Is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And Lawyers
Aren’t Doing Enough to Change That, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-in-the-nation-andlawyers-arent-doing-enough-to-change-that/ [https://perma.cc/3KUJ-4HG7]; Allison E. Laffey
& Allison Ng, Diversity and Inclusion in the Law: Challenges and Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N
(May 2, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/jiop/articles/2018/
diversity-and-inclusion-in-the-law-challenges-and-initiatives/ [https://perma.cc/KH2Q-E9VQ].
276. Laffey & Ng, supra note 275; ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG & STEPHANIE A. SCHARF, WALKING OUT THE DOOR: THE FACTS, FIGURES, AND FUTURE OF EXPERIENCED WOMEN LAWYERS IN
PRIVATE PRACTICE 2, 4, 8, 17 (2019), https://www.alm.com/intelligence/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/WALKING-OUT-THE-DOOR-FINAL-AS-OF-NOV-14-2019-pm.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8MMH-PL4F].
277. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate
Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 520-23 (1996); Veronica Root,
Retaining Color, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 587-88, 596, 612 (2014).
278. LIEBENBERG & SCHARF, supra note 276, at 1.
279. Id.
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female.280 Women comprise less than 25 percent of management
committee members, practice group leaders, and heads of office.281
Early indications are that the pandemic is only further exacerbating the problem.282
The experience of racial and ethnic minorities is no less depressing.283 While the percentage of minority associates has increased,
it still lags behind minority law graduates. And much of the (slow)
growth at the partnership level has been among Asians and Hispanics; growth in African Americans in the partnership ranks
peaked in 2008 and declined for seven years thereafter.284
U.S. corporations are hardly a panacea of gender and racial equity, far from it, but the numbers do look better overall than they do
in top U.S. law firms. According to a recent study by McKinsey, the
senior levels in Fortune 500 companies are comprised of: at the Vice
President level, 6 percent women of color, 13 percent men of color,
and 24 percent white women; at the Senior Vice President level, 5
percent women of color, 13 percent men of color, and 23 percent
white women; and at the C-Suite level, 3 percent women of color, 12
percent men of color, and 19 percent white women.285 These numbers fall far, far short of the ideal. But they do suggest that Fortune
500 companies are, nonetheless, more hospitable to women and
people of color than law firms.

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Seven Charts that Show COVID-19’s Impact on Women’s Employment, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/sevencharts-that-show-covid-19s-impact-on-womens-employment [https://perma.cc/WWX3-9H9U].
283. Literature attempting to explain the lack of diversity includes Galanter & Henderson,
supra note 251, at 1913-21 (explaining the specific linkage between the Cravath model and
gender and racial disparities in advancement within large firms); JANET E. GANS EPNER,
VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 12-13 (2006); Richard H. Sander, The
Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1796-98 tbl.16 (2006).
284. For more on the experience of minority lawyers, see, for example, David B. Wilkins,
“If You Can't Join 'Em, Beat 'Em!” The Rise and Fall of the Black Corporate Law Firm, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1733, 1734-39 (2008); ERIC CHUNG, SAMUEL DONG, XIAONAN APRIL HU, CHRISTINE KWON & GOODWIN LIU, A PORTRAIT OF ASIAN AMERICANS IN THE LAW 17 (2017), https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/59556778e58c62c7db3fbe84/t/596cf0638419c2e5a0dc5766/
1500311662008/170716_PortraitProject_SinglePages.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7LV-RBQY].
285. Women in the Workplace 2020, MCKINSEY & CO., (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.mckin
sey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/women-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/
Q5SE-NPSB].
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While the compensation—especially at the very top—could be
lower for lawyers practicing in firms owned and/or managed by
nonlawyers, it is worth remembering that, in one survey, a substantial number of partners, “lawyers who, in the eyes of many, have
reached the pinnacle of their profession—[reported that they] would
choose a different career if they could do it over again.”286 Consistently, lawyers in private practice report the lowest levels of
satisfaction and the highest levels of substance abuse compared to
public interest lawyers—those in government, academia, and the judiciary.287 In stark contrast, service as in-house counsel at a corporation ranks among the most satisfaction-inducing and coveted
environments for lawyers.288
With the “hunger games” of the Cravath up-or-out model eliminated, and the ushering in of a normal corporate work culture,
those who seek a better work-life balance—be it for caretaking responsibilities or other reasons—will now have available to them
midlevel management positions they can stay in for years. As their
caretaking responsibilities subside, or their work-life balance
priorities change, they will still be employees of the firm and able to
toss their hat in the ring for a senior position. This should help
firms retain members of underrepresented groups, who will remain
available as role models and mentors to those with similar profiles.
Rather than “leav[ing] before they leave,”289 women and minorities
will be able to look up the corporate ladder, and around, and see
that a long-term path for them at the firm is not a statistical
improbability. And this, hopefully, will contribute to a virtuous cycle
of retention and promotion.
Further, as the corporate finance of law firms matures and comes
to resemble that of other companies, new financial benefits will open
up. For example, partners will be able to cash out on their way out.
286. Molot, supra note 78, at 9 n.29 (quoting Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy,
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV.
871, 888 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
287. See Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon, What Makes Lawyers Happy?: A DataDriven Prescription to Redefine Professional Success, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 557-69
(2015); Douglas Quenqua, Lawyers with Lowest Pay Report More Happiness, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2015, 2:42 PM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/lawyers-with-lowest-pay-reportmore-happiness/ [https://perma.cc/9P3V-552R].
288. See CHUNG ET AL., supra note 284, at 28.
289. SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 93 (2013).
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Nonlawyer managers, such as chief marketing and chief operating
officers, will be able to receive compensation in stocks and options,
aligning incentives and improving efficiencies.
At the other end of the profession—solo and small firms—changes
can be even more fundamental with some such firms ceasing to be
economically viable and instead large corporations, such as chain
stores, banks, and accounting firms, taking over the market for
more routinized, small-scale legal work (this will probably be as
much the result of the introduction of paraprofessionals as it would
be from allowing investment in and management of legal practices).
While this change could present a loss of autonomy to some, it is not
unreasonable to assume that others would welcome the steady paycheck, steady work hours, and benefits that would come with such
employment.
None of this is to say, conclusively, that working as a lawyer for
a law firm that is structured more like a regular corporation would
be in every way better than working for the typical contemporary
law firm. But the foregoing Section should, at the very least, serve
to rebut the notion that such a shift would degrade lawyers’ working
conditions, autonomy, and dignity.
B. The Proposal: Law Firms as Benefit Entities
If moving away from lawyers’ monopoly on legal services is desirable in order to increase access to justice and diversity and to
shore up the dignity of the profession, the question becomes how
alternative organizational forms of practice and the participation of
nonlawyers can be structured to maintain and, moreover, despite
the general shareholder primacy doctrine, allow the profession’s
commitment to its core values. The answer is to require new types
of law practices to organize as LBEs, with courts and clients having
the ability to enforce the attendant requirements through courts’
regulatory function and clients’ private rights of action. At their
core, LBEs would include enforceable commitments to prioritize the
interests of clients and the courts—thus maintaining the status quo,
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according to which lawyers owe an undiluted duty of loyalty to their
clients—and serve as officers of the court.290
The proposed LBE requirement should be complemented by a
licensure regime modeled after the one adopted in Arizona as well
as the authorization of licensed and regulated legal paraprofessionals, also modeled on Arizona.291 Where constitutionally (or legislatively) permitted by state constitutions and laws, monitoring and
enforcement should be entrusted to the hands of the states’ highest
courts because judges are best suited to identify and understand
problematic behaviors. Arizona’s data-gathering requirement would
be highly beneficial as well.292 In a nutshell, I propose that Arizona’s
model be followed with the ABSs taking the form of LBEs.
The most important aspect of benefit entities is that in creating
them the legislatures have manifested their intent that, in some
contexts—importantly, when investors are on notice that they are
investing in an entity that is guided by stakeholder rather than
shareholder primacy—businesses be allowed to prioritize the
former. In so doing, legislatures clarified that it is legally permissible for managers to prioritize interests other than shareholder
profit and have signaled to courts that they are expected, all other
things being equal, to enforce stakeholder primacy in any dispute.
In other words, many state legislatures have already created a
model that solves the problem posed by the Arizona reform.
The state laws creating and authorizing benefit entities provide
for stakeholder governance in a number of ways. The most important of those ways is the requirement that such entities have general and specific “benefit purposes.” The core provision in the MBCL
imposes a duty on directors to “consider the interests of a specific
list of stakeholders as well as the ability of the corporation to accomplish its general benefit purpose (and its specific benefit purpose, if there is one).”293 A “[g]eneral public benefit” is defined as “[a]
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as
a whole, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation

290. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT rr. 1.7, 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
291. News Release, Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Off. of the Cts., supra note 7.
292. Order 173, supra note 183, § G(2)(c).
293. ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 68 (discussing MBCL § 301(a)). Because it is the most
common, this Section will focus on the MBCL as the model.
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assessed taking into account the impacts of the benefit corporation
as reported against a third-party standard.”294
In addition to the general benefit purpose, most statutes allow
(but do not require) entities to choose one or more specific public
benefit purposes. This is achieved by a catchall provision that
permits the benefit corporation to mandate in its constitutional
documents a purpose “conferring any other particular benefit on
society or the environment.”295 For the avoidance of any doubt, and
to bridge any gap between shareholder and stakeholder governance,
the benefit entity statutes clarify that the creation of the general
and any specific corporate public benefit is in the best interests of
the corporations.296 And the business judgment rule is explicitly
preserved with respect to fiduciary claims.297
The general benefit purpose of an LBE could be to safeguard
courts and the rule of law. Some firms may elect to go beyond,
pledging to do work that protects the environment, civil rights,
human rights, religious rights, free speech, or other social goals
which lawyers already regularly promote as a matter of course.
Their specific benefit purposes can be the various ways in which
firms can serve their clients through litigation, transaction,
compliance, and other work.
By making the primacy of nonlawyers’ (as well as lawyers’) commitments to clients and the courts a requirement for outside
investment in a provider of legal services—something which would
be clearly stated in the constitutional documents of the firm—
regulators will ensure that investors would be on notice that, should
profit-seeking conflict with the interests of clients or of the courts,
the latter will take precedence. Investors can decline to invest in
such enterprises or price their investments accordingly but, given
the transparency of the requirement, would have no grounds to demand that the managing lawyers prioritize profits over ethics as
they pursue individual cases or as they govern the firm as a whole.

294. MBCL, supra note 109, § 102.
295. ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 74.
296. MBCL, supra note 109, § 201(c).
297. Id. § 301(e); see also id. § 301 cmt. (“Subsection (e) confirms that the business
judgment rule applies to actions by directors under this section.”).

2022]

THE PARTNERSHIP MYSTIQUE

1009

Most importantly, benefit entity statutes are legislative acts that
are the result of years of careful design aimed at creating the ability
to choose stakeholder governance without disrupting the rest of
business law. As legislative acts, benefit entity statutes eliminate
the separation of powers concerns that arise from states’ high
courts, in their professional oversight capacity, creating new kinds
of entities exempt from the bedrock tenets of general business law.
The MBCL took years to design, and its approach was refined
through the input of dozens of academics, practitioners, and judges;
pored over in scholarship; and dissected in conferences and convenings over the course of many years. It then passed the scrutiny of
thirty-seven state legislatures.298 Setting aside the question of
whether they are legally competent to do so, state court judges are
certainly capable of replicating that careful work. But why? Doing
so would be a massively inefficient duplication of effort in addition
to raising difficult legal questions about the scope of the courts’
powers in the exercise of their oversight function.
To emphasize the importance of general and specific benefits, and
to ensure that they are not simply window dressing, statutes based
on the MBCL provide for “benefit enforcement proceedings.”299 The
two possible causes of action are a “failure ... to pursue or create
general public benefit or a specific public benefit set forth in its
articles of incorporation” and a “violation of [the directors’] obligation, duty, or standard of conduct under this [chapter].”300 While
overall the MBCL follows “conventional corporate law by focusing
on fiduciary duties and board procedures to enforce” stakeholder
primacy, it deviates in that it establishes court review over whether
a benefit corporation is meeting its benefit purpose.301 In the case of
LBEs, states should follow Arizona, which provides for clear enforcement measures vested in the state supreme court, the Bar, the
compliance lawyers, and the Authorized Persons. States should also
consider granting clients a private right of action.

298.
299.
300.
301.

Supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
MBCL, supra note 109, § 102.
Id. § 305(a)(1)-(2).
ALEXANDER, supra note 88, at 71.
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Another hallmark of the MBCL is a requirement that the benefit
corporation publish an “annual benefit report” based on a thirdparty standard.302 The report must describe the company’s efforts to
achieve the general and specific benefits to which it committed, its
success in those efforts, any obstacles, and its rationale for choosing
the third-party reporting standard.303 For LBEs, the third party
should be the state bar associations and the third-party standard
should be the states’ rules of professional conduct. This will ensure
that LBEs create a public record of their compliance with the
obligations of legal ethics. That record could be used by investors to
price investments, by the courts to monitor compliance, and even by
potential clients to evaluate firms they may wish to engage. Indeed,
many firms are already creating similar reports, featuring their
success on behalf of their clients, pro bono work, and diversity
efforts, to use for marketing and recruiting purposes. Individual
jurisdictions could of course choose to impose more robust reporting
requirements, as did Arizona.304 These may even be normatively
desirable to ensure that investors, the courts, and the public have
adequate information about legal service providers’ compliance with
their ethical obligations.
In summary, states that wish to liberalize the prohibition on
nonlawyer participation in the business of providing legal services
should adopt a two-prong approach: reform the rules governing the
legal profession and modify the bedrock norm of shareholder
primacy in business entities. Arizona provides an excellent model
for the first prong—its new regime updates the rules governing the
practice of law, institutes a licensing regime, and nominates a regulator. Arizona’s reforms include eliminating the fee-sharing prohibition and revising the definition of the unauthorized practice of
law to allow participation by nonlawyers. Depending on the state’s
constitutional structure, a version of the Arizona model could be put
in place by either the courts or the legislature, as appropriate in the
jurisdiction. To effectuate the second prong and to protect firms that
include nonlawyers from potential conflicts between profits and
ethics, state legislatures should enact an LBE statute (or amend
302. MBCL, supra note 109, § 401(a).
303. Id. § 401(a)(1).
304. See Order 173, supra note 183, § G(2)(c)-(3)(b)(6).
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their existing benefit entities laws to provide for LBEs) that
explicitly enshrines stakeholder primacy and designates clients
and the courts as the stakeholders.
C. A Note on Benefits Entities and the Professions
While this Article restricts itself to a discussion of the legal profession, it is worth noting that its core tenets could be applied to
other professions, especially ones in which the professional is a
fiduciary and/or where the public’s interest in the functioning of the
profession is paramount. An example would be doctors and mental
health professionals and the health care system. On the one hand,
such professionals should be allowed to seek outside capital. This
would decrease their costs, with the savings hopefully being rolled
onto the clients/patients. Such professionals should also be able to
partner with other professionals whose expertise are syngenetic and
where the whole would exceed the sum of the parts. Why not let
psychologists or social workers practice under one roof with family
lawyers? Why should clients not benefit from having their accountants collaborate with the tax or wills and trusts attorneys?
The global adoption of ABS laws—in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Arizona—that implicitly communicate a desire that lawyers, qua professionals, place clients and the justice system first
show that, far from an-end-to-corporate-history in the form of global
shareholder primacy, developed economies are gravitating towards
such a carveout for at least one profession.
Clearly imposing client/patient primacy obligations on such professionals, assigning the right regulator to enforce them, and providing private rights of action will allow us to wash the baby rather
than throw it out with the bathwater. Benefit entities now pave the
road to doing just that while creating an exception to the shareholder primacy rule for the professions that does not do away with
shareholder primacy more generally, in other areas of the economy.
CONCLUSION
We are at the start of an era of fundamental reform in the market
for legal services in the United States. The unlikely allies in launch-
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ing this reform have been litigation (now law firm) financiers, on the
one hand, and a coalition of scholars and reformers within the
profession, on the other. The financiers kicked in the door in the
name of profit, confident from their victory against the champerty
doctrine that the law would catch up with their practices. The reformers, meanwhile, have been more patient and more concerned
with monopoly, the high cost of legal services, and access to justice.
Now that the law is catching up, in Arizona at least, the model is
very much from the reformers’ camp. Superior in nearly every way
to the NYCBA’s disclosure-focused proposal, Arizona’s model is
poised to influence other states looking to liberalize the market for
legal services. In a twist of irony, this may mean that litigation and
law firm financiers fade away. Traditional investors’ discomfort with
the ambiguous legality of litigation finance and the complexity of
valuing legal claims305 will wane, and firmer legal footing and the
more straightforward calculations for investing in a business (that
is, in a law firm) will attract more traditional funders (who will
presumably offer more favorable terms).
Competitive forces, too, played a role. As with litigation finance,
pressure from global law firms abroad, and especially in London,
propel reforms without which major U.S. firms stand to lose clientele. In that context, Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s successful liberalization projects deserve attention for what they can
tell us about how nonlawyer participation might work. But in the
shorter term, as states begin to form exploratory commissions and
study groups to look at their next steps, the reform processes followed in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Arizona should be our
focus as much as the substance of their reforms. In each place the
reform was successful in part because nonlawyers participated in
and even led the decision-making.306 This is in contrast to the United States where reform has always been considered, and rejected,
by bar associations without participation of nonlawyers. Lawyers,
and jurists more generally (judges and scholars), should absolutely
have a seat at the table, even a prominent one, but not a throne.

305. Steinitz, supra note 12, at 1902.
306. See Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly Traded Law Firms Abroad
Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 67, 76.
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Ending lawyers’ monopoly over the provision of legal services will
likely have a range of benefits, most notably an increase in access
to justice, in the diversity of the profession, and the well-being of the
practitioners. But lawyers’ century-long insistence that they must
be excluded from the capital markets lest they find themselves
forced to compromise their duties to their clients and the courts
when the purse strings are tugged must be taken seriously. Compromise would, indeed, be forced upon them in any traditional business
entity legally bound to follow the principles of shareholder primacy.
But in an LBE, organized under state laws permitting benefit
entities, lawyers and nonlawyers alike could be compelled with
equal legal force to put the interests of their clients and the courts
before those of shareholders. Owners and investors, on notice of the
stakeholder primacy, would price their investments accordingly and
would have no grounds to contest a director’s or officer’s decision to
act in the best interests of a client even when doing so means making less money. Stakeholder primacy is the way out of the conundrum, a way to have our cake and eat it too.

